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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
JEFFREY DANE MURRAY, 
Supreme Court Case No. 39400 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.
 
HONORABLE DEBORAH A. BAIL
 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO BOISE, IDAHO 
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Date: 3/15/2012 Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County User: CCTHIEBJ 
Time: 01 :30 PM ROAReport 
Page 1 of 1 Case: CV-PC-2010-21310 Current Judge: Deborah Bail 
Jeffrey Murray, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Jeffrey Murray, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
10/27/2010 NCPC CCLATICJ New Case Filed - Post Conviction Relief District Court Clerk 
PETN CCNELSRF Verified Petition for Post Conviction Relief District Court Clerk 
CERT CCNELSRF Certificate Of Mailing District Court Clerk 
10/29/2010 PROS PRPETZDN Prosecutor assigned Tessie Buttram District Court Clerk 
ORDR DCTHERTL Order for Transcripts Deborah Bail 
11/8/2010 RQST CCKINGAJ Request for Judicial Notice Deborah Bail 
11/17/2010 TRAN DCTHERTL Transcript Filed Deborah Bail 
11/22/2010 ANSW CCMASTLW Answer to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief Deborah Bail 
11/30/2010 OBJC CCSWEECE Objection To State's Request For Dismissal Deborah Bail 
1/24/2011 MOTN CCBOYIDR Motion for Summary Disposition Deborah Bail 
MEMO CCBOYIDR Memorandum in Support of Petitioners Motion for Deborah Bail 
Summary Disposition 
2/9/2011 RSPS CCRANDJD Response to Motion for Summary Disposition Deborah Bail 
2/16/2011 RPLY CCDWONCP Reply to State's Response to Petitioner's Motion Deborah Bail 
for Summary Disposition 
417/2011 MOTN CCNELSRF Motion for Order Case to Mediation or Set Deborah Bail 
Hearing on Petitioners Motion for Summary 
Disposition 
4/11/2011 NOTH CCWRIGRM Notice Of Hearing (05/31/11 @ 9:30am) Deborah Bail 
HRSC CCWRIGRM Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Deborah Bail 
05/31/2011 09:30 AM) Post Conviction Relief 
4/12/2011 DCTHERTL Order to Transport (5/31/11 @ 9:30 am) Deborah Bail 
5/31/2011 DCHH CCTHERTL Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Deborah Bail 
05/31/2011 09:30 AM: District Court Hearing Helc 
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 150 Post Conviction Relief 
10/20/2011 DEOP CCTHERTL Decision Deborah Bail 
CERT CCTHERTL Certificate Of Mailing Deborah Bail 
CDIS CCTHERTL Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho, Deborah Bail 
Other Party; Murray, Jeffrey, Subject. Filing date: 
10/20/2011 
STAT CCTHERTL STATUS CHANGED: Closed Deborah Bail 
11/18/2011 APSC CCTHIEBJ Appealed To The Supreme Court Deborah Bail 
MOTN CCTHIEBJ Motion For The Appointment Of The State Deborah Bail 
Appellate Public Defender And To Proceed In 
Forma Pauperis 
1/9/2012 NOTC CCHEAT.IL Notice Of Filing Application For Public Defender Deborah Bail 
1/18/2012 ORDR CCTHERTL Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender Deborah Bail 
and Allowing Petitioner to Proceed in Forma 
Pauperis 
3/15/2012 NOTC CCTHIEBJ Notice Of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court Deborah Bail 
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Comes now Jeffrey Murray being duly sworn upon oath states as follows.
 
I. INTRODUCTION: 
I. I am the petitioner in this case. 
2. I was charged in 2009 by amended information with the offenses of attempted 
strangulation and battery. 
3. The Ada County Number for that case is CRFE-2009-61 02. 
4. Attorney Jared Martens represented me. 
5. I pleaded guilty to a charge of felony domestic battery, in violation of I.C. § 18-918. 
6. This plea was made pursuant to an agreement between the parties. 
7. The agreement was that a ten-year sentence with three years fixed should be imposed 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 1 • 
000003


















but suspended and that I should be placed on probation. One of the conditions of probation was 
that I would serve 120 days in jail. 
8. Mr. Martens told me that I would not get more than 120 days. 
9. I was sentenced on September 8, 2009. 
10. The Court did not follow the plea agreement. It imposed a ten-year sentence with 
three years fixed and did not suspend the sentence. 
11. The judgment and sentence was filed on September 15,2009. 
12. On September 24,2009, Attorney Joe Ellsworth appeared as counsel in place of 
Jared Martens. 
13. The time to file a Notice of Appeal expired on October 27,2009. 
14. No Notice of Appeal was filed. 
15. On December 8, 2009, Mr. Ellsworth filed an I.C.R. 35 motion for reduction of 
sentence and a memorandum in support on my behalf. 
16. On January 29,2010, an Order denying the Rule 35 motion was filed. 
17. A Notice of Appeal was filed from the order denying the Rule 35 motion. 
18. That appeal is still pending. 
19. With respect to this conviction, I have not filed any other petitions for post-
conviction relief. 
II. ALLEGATIONS REGARDING THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: 
THE PLEA OF GUILTY WAS INVALID BECAUSE IT WAS NOT 
KNOWING, INTELLIGENT AND VOLUNTARY. 
20. I was not aware at the time I entered the guilty plea that the Court did not have to 
follow the terms of the plea agreement. 





21. Had I known the Court did not have to follow the tenns of the plea agreement, I 
would not have pleaded guilty. 
22. Mr. Martens did not tell me that the Court did not have to follow the tenns of the 
plea agreement. 
23. The Court did not tell me that it did not have to follow the tenns of the plea 
agreement. 
24. A true and correct copy of the transcript of the guilty plea and sentencing hearings is 
attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
25. The Court's guilty plea questionnaire did not infonn me that the Court was not 
required to follow the tenns of the plea agreement. 
26. Paragraph 11 of the Court's guilty plea questionnaire, which asked if! understood 
that the Court is not required to follow the tenns of the plea agreement, did not require me to 
circle either "Yes" or "No." 
27. A true and correct copy of the guilty plea questionnaire is attached hereto as Exhibit 
B. 
28. I did not respond to this portion of the guilty plea questionnaire because I believed 
that the Court was required to follow the tenns of the plea agreement. 
29. Mr. Martens specifically told me that paragraph 11 did not apply to me because I was 
only to be sentenced to 120 days. 






III. ALLEGATIONS REGARDING THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: 
COUNSEL AT THE PLEA AND SENTENCING HEARINGS WAS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE. 
A. Allet:ations ret:ardint: ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea hearint:. 
30. I reallege the facts set forth in Paragraphs 1-29 above. 
31. The guilty plea questionnaire infonned me that I was waiving my rights under "State 
v. Estrada." 
32. Mr. Martens never explained to me what rights I had under "State v. Estrada." 
33. At the guilty plea hearing, the Court ordered that a domestic violence evaluation be 
done and submitted to the Court. 
34. Mr. Martens never explained to me that I had a right to obtain my own domestic 
violence evaluation which would not be released to the Court without my pennission. 
35. Had I been so infonned, I would have obtained my own confidential domestic 
violence evaluation prior to entering a plea of guilty. 
36. I only agreed to waive my rights under "State v. Estrada" because I thought that I 
could not get more than 120 days ofjail. 
37. Mr. Martens should not have allowed me to submit to a non-confidential domestic 
violence evaluation prior to sentencing because he could not have known what the results of that 
evaluation would be. 
38. I submitted to the court-ordered evaluation because I believed I was required to do 
so. 
39. The court-ordered evaluation was unfavorable to me. 
40. The court-ordered evaluation reached its conclusions based upon misunderstandings 









of the facts. 
41. Mr. Martens was in possession of the court-ordered evaluation prior to sentencing. 
42. Mr. Martens did not go over the court-ordered evaluation with me prior to 
sentencing. 
43. Mr. Martens did not contact Mr. Wilson or take any actions to try to correct those 
factual misunderstandings in the court-ordered evaluations 
44. Mr. Martens did not inform me that I could get my own evaluation to rebut the 
findings in the court-ordered evaluation. 
45. In November of2008, I was evaluated by William Pittman, Ph.D., in connection with 
my claim for Social Security Disability benefits. 
46. While Mr. Wilson suggested that I have Narcissistic Personality Disorder, Dr. 
Pittman did not find an Axis I diagnosis 
47. Dr. Pittman did find I have Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder. 
48. I did not believe an additional evaluation was needed because I believed that the 
Court was bound to follow the plea agreement. 
49. Had I known the Court was not bound by the plea agreement, I would have obtained 
another evaluation to challenge the conclusions in the court-ordered evaluation. 
50. Mr. Martens did not go over the Presentence Investigation Report with me until the 
morning of sentencing. 
51. I was given the PSI only shortly before the sentencing hearing and did not have 
enough time to review it prior to sentencing. 
52. Mr. Martens did not inform me that I could seek a continuance of the sentencing 





hearing so I could go over the PSI with him. 
53. The PSI contained damaging statements made by my wife which were untrue. 
54. Mr. Martens did not attempt to disprove these false statements. 
55. Mr. Martens did not attempt to question the credibility of these statements. 
56. At the time of the sentencing, my wife had been charged with domestic assault 
against her boyfriend Greg Evans for throwing things at him and threatening him with a tire iron. 
[This charge was later dismissed.] 
57. Further, my wife was charged in August of2009 with aggravated assault for 
threatening her boyfriend's mother with a kitchen knife. [This charge is pending.] 
58. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the Affidavit of Complaint 
against my wife on the domestic assault charge. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and 
correct copy of the Affidavit of Complaint against my wife on the aggravated assault charge. 
59. Mr. Martens did not alert the Court to these pending charges. 
60. Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of an article which ran in the 
October 9,2010 on-line edition of the Jackson Sun. It notes that my wife killed her boyfriend in 
July 2010 by stabbing him with a kitchen knife, but was not indicted. Moreover, it also notes the 
charges listed in ,-r 56 and 57 above and that the prosecutor intends to resubmit the murder charge 
to the grand jury. 
61. That Mr. Martens did not inform the Court that it was mistaken about important facts 
during sentencing. In particular, 
61.1. The Court stated that I had engaged in "prior incidents of domestic 
violence" and "stalking behavior of other girlfriends or significant others." 
Sentencing Transcript, pg. 33, In. 8-12. Neither of these statements are true. My 





wife made these accusations to the police but later recanted. 
61.2. My wife told the police that the photographs the Court thought showed 
domestic violence actually showed consensual behavior. 
61.3. There is nothing in the PSI that I stalked other girlfriends or significant 
others. There is a report that Dorinda Balonis accused me of breaking her porch 
light, but the police officer who took the report did not file charges noting that 
Ms. Balonis was highly intoxicated and had no proof to support her accusation. 
61.4. The Court mentions four times during the sentencing that I have "violated 
past protection order§." Sentencing Transcript, pg. 36, In. 3; pg. 35, In. 13-15 and 
23 (emphasis added). While it is true that I have one conviction for violating a 
protection order, there are no other instances. 
61.5. The Court mentions that I have engaged in sadistic sexual behavior with 
multiple partners and that there is a pattern of "extreme sadistic behavior towards 
partners." But there is no reliable evidence of that as those accusations only come 
from the uncorroborated statements of my estranged wife who is currently facing 
a murder charge. 
62. Had Mr. Martens been adequately prepared for the sentencing hearing, the Court 
would have followed the plea agreement. 
B. Allegations regarding ineffective assistance of counsel post-sentencing 
63. I did not learn that the Court was not required to follow the terms of the plea 
agreement until after the sentencing hearing. 
64. When Mr. Martens informed me that the Court was not required to follow the terms 
of the plea agreement, I told him that I did not understand that when I entered my guilty plea. 
65. Mr. Martens never informed me that I could ask the Court for permission to 
withdraw my guilty plea. 
66. Had Mr. Martens so informed me, I would have asked the Court for permission to 
withdraw my guilty plea. 







67. Mr. Martens did not inform me that I had the right to appeal the sentence imposed. 
68. Had I known I could have appealed the sentence imposed I would have done so. 
IV. ALLEGATIONS REGARDING THE THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION: 
COUNSEL AT POST-TRIAL PROCEEDINGS WAS 
CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE. 
69. I reallege the matters set forth in Paragraphs 1-68 above. 
70. Mr. Ellsworth became my counsel nine days after the judgment and sentence was 
filed. 
71. Before Mr. Ellsworth filed his appearance in my case, I told him that I did not know 
at the time of the guilty plea that the Court was not required to follow the terms of the plea 
agreement. 
72. Mr. Ellsworth never informed me that I could ask the Court for permission to 
withdraw my guilty plea. 
73. Had Mr. Ellsworth so informed me, I would have asked the Court for permission to 
withdraw my guilty plea. 
74. I had 42 days after the judgment and sentence was filed in which to file an I.c.R. 33 
motion to withdraw my guilty plea. 
75. Mr. Ellsworth did not file a motion to withdraw guilty plea on my behalf. 
76. Mr. Ellsworth also did not inform me that I could appeal the sentence imposed. 
77. Had Mr. Ellsworth so informed me, I would have asked him to appeal the sentence. 
78. Mr. Ellsworth did not inform me that I could obtain another evaluation in order 
to rebut the findings in the court-ordered evaluation and support my Rule 35 motion. 
79. Had I known I could obtain another evaluation, I would have obtained one. 




80. Mr. Ellsworth did not attempt to disprove the false statements made against me in the 
Rule 35 Motion. 
81. Had he done so, he would have found evidence which would have demonstrated the 
unreliability of my wife's testimony as set forth in ~~ 56-60 above. 
82. That Mr. Ellsworth did not inform the Court that it was mistaken about important 
facts during sentencing as set forth in ~ 61 above. 
83. Had Mr. Ellsworth adequately prepared the Rule 35 motion and supported it with 
reasonable available information, the Court would have granted the Rule 35 and followed the 
plea agreement. 
V. PRAYER FOR RELIEF: Petitioner requests the following relief: 
A. That my guilty plea be vacated or, alternatively, 
B. That judgment be withheld and I be placed on probation or, alternatively, 
C. That my sentence be modified to a sentence of ten years with three years fixed, with 
that sentence being suspended and me being placed on probation or alternatively, 
D. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
 
Respectfully submitted this::L1-r;t:y of October, 2010.
 
~~~~4Cr-O-= 
Attorney for Jeffrey Murray 









VERlFICATION OF PETITION 
I, Jeffrey Murray, being duly sworn under oath, state: 
I know of the contents of the foregoing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and that the 
m,tt", 'nd ,1I,g,hon,,~ forth ",1m, "d :~fmYknow''''g' "d b,hot 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on th~~ of October, 2010, I caused a true and correct 




to: Tessie Buttram 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St., #3191 
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 













Appealed from the District Court of the 
Fourth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, 





IDAHO STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S 
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Attorneys for Appellant 
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Attorney General, State of Idaho 
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Susan G. Gambee 
CSR No. 18 
EXHIBIT A 
Susan G. Ganbee, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho 
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Official Court Reporter, of the above-entitled action, and 
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State of Idaho vs. Jeffrey Dane M Case No. CR·FE·200Q·61 02 
3 
1 DISTRICT COURT OF THE Fourth JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
2
 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF Ada 
3 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x Case No. CR-FE-2009-6102 
4 STATE OF IDAHO, 
5 Plaintiff, 
6 vs. 






13 REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 
14 
Held on July 13, 2009 & September 8, 2009, before 
15 











Susan G. Ganbee, Official Court Reporter, Ada County,ldaho 
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4 TESSIE A. BUTTRAM
 
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
 









8 Martens Law Office
 
404 S. Eighth Street
 
9 Boise, Idaho 83702
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Susan G. Ganbee, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho 
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Jeffrey Dane I 
!EXAMINATION BY THE COURT ............. '" '" 
* * * * 
Susan G. Gcmbee, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho 000018
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4 mE COURT: State versus Jeffrey Murray.
 
5 MR. MARTENS: Your Honor, could I talk to
 
6 the prosecutor one Uttle bit on this, and then we
 
7 will be ready on this, I think?
 




10 mE COURT: Let's resume with this case,
 
11 State versus Murray. What's going on?
 
12 MR. MARTENS: Your Honor, I have been
 
13 working with the prosecutor on this, and I think
 
14 we have come up with an agreement that will work
 
15 for Mr. Murray, and that would be -- I've got an
 
16 amended complaint here, if you don't have it.
 
17 MS. BUTTRAM: I hadn't provided it to the
 
18 court yet. I wasn't sure it was going to happen,
 
19 but I'm providing the court with a Second Amended
 
20 Information, Your Honor, amended from felony
 
21 attempted strangulation domestic battery to one
 
22 count of felony domestic violence.
 









2 MS. BUTTRAM: I believe so.
 
3 THE COURT: Well, I think there would have
 










9 MR. MARTENS: Yes, that's fine. He will
 
10 waive, Your Honor.
 




13 mE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
 
14 THE COURT: Is there anything else you are
 
15 expecting I didn't hear about?
 
16 THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am.
 
17 THE COURT: Okay. And so you do want to
 
18 plead guilty under these terms today?
 
19 MR. MARTENS: Yes, ma'am.
 
20 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
 




23 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
 




Case No. CR·FE·2009-6102 
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1 that he would stipulate to the elements of 
2 household member and traumatic injury, marks on 
3 the neck, he will waive his right to appeal on 
4 those two elements. 
5 The State would cap its recommendation 
6 at three plus seven, 120 days Ada County Jail, no 
7 contact with the victim, need to get a domestic 
8 violence and alcohol evaluation. Restitution and 
9 court costs are open. 
10 The defense is free to argue for less. 
11 And in talking to the prosecutor, if he meets the 
12 requirements, they are not going to promote but 
13 not object to a withheld judgment in this case. 
14 THE COURT: So he would plead guilty to the 
15 charge in the Second Amended Information, and the 
16 State will ask for three years fixed, followed by 
17 seven years indeterminate, for a ten-year 
18 sentence, suspended, up to 120 days Ada County 
19 Jail, would get a domestic violence evaluation and 
20 alcohol evaluation, and the State might not oppose 
21 a withheld. 
22 MS. BUTIRAM: Yes, Your Honor. Restitution 
23 is open, asking for court costs, and a no-contact 
24 order as well. 
25 THE COURT: Okay, is there an Estrada 
9 
1 MR. MARTENS: He has read it, Your Honor. I 
2 believe we would waive. 
3 THE COURT: You don't want me to read it to 
4 you? You don't need that? 
5 THE DEFENDANT: No. 
6 THE COURT: Do you understand the charge? 
7 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
8 THE COURT: Do you consent to the filing of 
9 the Second Amended Information? 
10 MR. MARTENS: Yes, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: All right. Well, do you have a 
12 guilty plea advisory form to submit to the court, 
13 then? 
14 MR. MARTENS: We have not done that. We 
15 have just been working it out. 
16 THE COURT: We will take a ten-minute 
17 recess, or 15 -let's take a lS-minute recess. 
18 If you need more time, let me know, and we will 
19 just go through that. 
20 MR. MARTENS: Okay. 
21 THE COURT: You should layout the terms in 
22 that as well. 
23 (Recess taken.) 
24 THE COURT: Are you done there, counsel? 
25 MR. MARTENS: Yes, Your Honor. 
Susan G. Ganbee, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho 
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1 THE COURT: If you will hand that form to 1 
2 the bailiff, he will hand it to me. 2 
3 (Both complied.) 3 
4 mE COURT: All right. So, counsel, did you 4 
5 get all the discovery in this case? 5 
6 MR. MARTENS: Yes, Your Honor. 6 
7 mE COURT: Have you reviewed it with your 7 
8 client? 8 
9 MR. MARTENS: Yes, we have. 9 
10 mE COURT: Did you advise him of his rights 10 
11 and defenses? 11 
12 MR. MARTENS: Yes, Your Honor. 12 
13 mE COURT: And he is aware of the 13 
14 consequences of a guilty plea? 14 
15 MR. MARTENS: Yes, Your Honor. 15 
16 mE COURT: And you went over the guilty 16 
17 plea advisory form with him? 17 
18 MR. MARTENS: Yes, we just did. 18 
19 mE COURT: Any problems or questions? 19 
20 MR. MARTENS: No, no, I answered any that he 20 
21 had. 21 
22 mE COURT: Okay, and that's your signature 22 
23 on the last page? 23 
24 MR. MARTENS: Yes, Your Honor. 24 
25 mE COURT: An reason wh we shouldn't 0 25 
12 
1 Q. And you know what you were charged with 1 
2 originally? 2 
3 A. Yes, ma'am. 3 
4 Q. And you know what the maximum penalty 4 
5 for each offense is? 5 
6 A. Yes, ma'am. 6 
7 Q. Has anybody promised you that I would 7 
8 be easy on you if you would plead guilty? 8 
9 A. No, ma'am. 9 
10 Q. Has anybody intimidated you or 10 
11 threatened you to make you plead guilty? 11 
12 A. No, ma'am. 12 
13 Q. Has anyone offered you a reward or 13 
14 incentive to plead guilty? 14 
15 A. No, ma'am. 15 
16 Q. Are you pleading guilty even though you 16 
17 think you are innocent? 17 
18 A. No, ma'am. 18 
19 Q. Now, the way it works is, if I take 19 
20 your guilty plea, I will be ordering a presentence 20 
21 report, and that would give me lots of information 21 
22 about your background. 22 
23 It would also give me information about 23 
24 any past record. A past record is a major factor 24 
25 in decidin what the sentence ou ht to be. You 25 
11 
forward? 
MR. MARTENS: No, Your Honor. 
mE COURT: Okay. 
Mr. Murray, if you will stand, the 
clerk is going to swear you in. 
JEFFREY DANE MURRAY, 
the defendant herein, having been first duly 
sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 
EXAMINAnON 
BY mE COURT: 
Q. Go ahead and say your full name for the 
record.. 
A. Jeffrey Dane Murray. 
Q. And, Mr. Murray, you do have a high 
school degree and some college? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. What do you do to make a living? 
A. Last 20 years I worked in Illinois, and 
I broke my back, and I'm on Social Security 
disability now. 
Q. Now, you understand what you are 
charged with in the Second Amended Information? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
13 
are aware of that? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. Are you on probation or parole? 
A. No, ma'am. 
Q. Did you make confessions or admissions 
to the police in this case? 
A. Just one. 
Q. You talked to the police about what 
happened? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. Did you do that freely and voluntarily? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. Are you addicted or accustomed to the 
use of alcohol or drugs? 
A. No, ma'am. I was on medication up 
until last month when I came out here, and I have 
gotten off it, just work it out, that type thing. 
Q. SO you are not under the influence of 
anything at all today? 
A. No, ma'am. 
Q. Any psycholOgical or mental problems 
that might have some bearing on the case? 
A. I just have anxiety and am being 
treated for that. 
Q. Are ou havin an trouble 
Susan G. Gcmbee, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho 
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1 understanding what's going on today?
 
2 A. No, ma'am.
 




5 A. No, ma'am.
 
6 Q. SO when did you decide to plead gUilty?
 
7 A. Today, I suppose.
 
8 MR. MARTENS: We have been talking about it
 
9 for a while, but we have been working on a plea
 




12 Q. BY THE COURT: So you have been
 
13 thinking about it for a while?
 
14 A. Yes, ma'atn, just families and stuff,
 
15 but didn't want no problem.
 




18 A. Yes, ma'am.
 




21 A. Yes, ma'am.
 
22 Q. Now, when you talked to him, did you
 
23 tell him what happened?
 
24 A. Yes, ma'am.
 
25 Q. Did he tell ou to our satisfaction
 
16 
1 Q. Now, you understand once I take your
 
2 guilty plea to the charge in the Second Amended
 
3 Information, you will not be able to change your
 
4 mind and plead not gUilty?
 
5 A. Yes. ma'am.
 
6 Q. Okay. And this is a felony. If you
 
7 keep putting felonies on your record, you could
 
8 set yourself up to be charged some day as a
 
9 persistent violator or habitual offender.
 
10 It does not happen now. It's something
 




13 A. Yes, ma'am.
 
14 Q. It's Significant, because what it means
 
15 is, a person can get a longer sentence because -­




18 A. Yes, ma'am.
 
19 Q. Now, you went over the guilty plea
 
20 advisory form with your lawyer?
 
21 A. Yes, ma'am.
 
22 Q. And you understand you are giving up
 
23 your rights under State versus Estrada, and that
 
24 means that you cannot refuse to answer any
 
25 uestion or rovide an information that mi ht
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1 what your rights and defenses are? 
2 A. Yes, ma'am. 
3 Q. And he did talk to you about the 
4 consequences of a guilty plea? 
5 A. Yes, ma'am. 
6 Q. Are you satisfied with his 
7 representation? 
8 A. Yes, ma'am. 
9 Q. Are there any witnesses that you wanted 
10 him to talk to that he has not talked to? 
11 A. No, ma'am. 
12 Q. Is there anything else that you wanted 
13 him to do that he has not done? 
14 A. No, ma'am. 
15 Q. Okay, now, you do realize that you are 
16 giving up your constitutional right to trial by 
17 jury, confront and cross-examine the witnesses 
18 against you, and you are giving up the privilege 
19 against self-incrimination? 
20 A. Yes, ma'am. 
21 Q. And you understand also that you are 
22 giving up your legal and factual defenses; you 
23 will be saying the charge is true if you plead 
24 guilty? 
25 A. Yes, ma'am. 
17 
1 tend to show you committed some other crime? 
2 You need to talk freely and openly with 
3 the presentence investigator and with any domestic 
4 violence evaluator about any problems that you 
5 might have that might have a bearing upon 
6 sentencing. 
7 A. Yes, ma'am. 
8 Q. And you are aware of that? 
9 A. Yes, ma'am. 
10 Q. Okay. Now, did you have any problems 
11 understanding questions on the guilty plea 
12 advisory form? 
13 A. No, ma'am. 
14 Q. Did you answer those questions 
15 honestly? 
16 A. Yes, ma'am. 
17 Q. And did you answer all the questions 
18 freely and voluntarily? 
19 A. Yes, ma'am. 
20 Q. SO it's your decision to plead guilty 
21 in this case? 
22 A. Yes, ma'am. 
23 Q. Okay, I'm just going to take a look at 
24 all this. And are you preserving some rights for 
25 a eal? 
Susan G. Gcmbee, Official Court Reporter, Ada County, Idaho 
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1 MR. MARTENS: I think that he's still free 
2 to appeal the court's decision, but he simply is 
3 not -- he can't appeal those based upon those two 
4 elements. 
5 TIlE COURT: What decision? You mean the 
6 sentencing decision? 
7 MR. MARTENS: Right. 
8 TIlE COURT: That's not a problem. So just 
9 the sentence, then? 
10 MR. MARTENS: Yes.
 
11 TIlE COURT: Okay. Because I don't consider
 




14 TIlE WITNESS: Okay.
 
15 Q. BY THE COURT: Well, anything else?
 




18 A. No, ma'am. It's been covered.
 
19 Q. Okay, then, so what happened? Why is
 
20 this charge true?
 
21 A. The young lady that I was breaking up
 
22 with, I was going to move back to Tennessee, and
 
23 she didn't want me to leave, and she became
 
24 initated with me. And at some point I held her,
 
25 I suppose, by the neck, arm, some seconds.
 
20 
1 but they were staying together overnight at this 
2 hotel where this incident occurred. The defendant 
3 and the victim had gotten into an argument over 
4 seeing other people. 
5 The victim did say that she had pushed 
6 him, hit him in order to get him away from her, 
7 and then she reported he grabbed her by the neck, 
8 squeezed her neck for five to ten seconds. 
9 On the 1 to 7, a 7 on the pain scale 
10 caused difficult breathing, caused swelling to her 
11 neck, which turned into wheezing. This did happen 
12 here in Ada County State ofIdaho. 
13 Q. BY THE COURT: So you are conceding the 
14 household members element to take advantage of the 
15 plea bargain agreement? 
16 A. Yes, ma'am. 
17 Q. You do wish to plead guilty to this 
18 offense? 
19 A. Yes, ma'am. I was preparing to leave 
20 town that morning. 
21 TIlE COURT: All right. Well, this is 
22 properly pled. You say you do want to plead 
23 guilty to it. There is a factual basis to this 
24 plea. I do think you understand the nature of the 
25 offense and the conse uences of leadin ull , 
Csse No. CR·FE·2009-6102 
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1 Q. Did this happen on April3rd, 2009?
 
2 A. Yes, ma'am.
 
3 Q. Was it in Ada County?
 
4 A. Yes, ma'am.
 
5 Q. And you and Nicole Steffler were
 
6 household members at that time?
 
7 A. Yes, ma'am.
 




10 A. (No audible response.) 
11 Q. What happened? 
12 A. Yes, ma'am. 
13 Q. SO you did commit a battery on her, 
14 that is, an unlawful touching? 
15 A. To hold her back and get her stopped. 
16 Q. SO is this charge in the Second Amended 
17 Information true? 
18 A. Yes, ma'am.. 
19 THE COURT: Counsel, your version? 
20 MS. BUTTRAM: Your Honor, the information 
21 the State has, the defendant and Nicole Steffler 
22 had been dating approximately six months. 
23 They, at a portion in their time in the 
24 relationship, lived together, but at the time this 
25 ha ened, the weren't residin in the same lace, 
21 
1 and it looks to me like it's freely and
 
2 voluntarily made, so I will accept your plea, and
 
3 I will have the clerk enter it.
 
4 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
 
5 THE COURT: I'm going to set a time for
 
6 disposition. I would like to set August 24th at 3,
 
7 if that's available for counsel.
 
8 MR. MARTENS: August 24th at 3 would be
 
9 fine, Your Honor.
 
10 THE COURT: I'm going to order a domestic 
11 violence evaluation from Tom Wilson. You will 
12 need to take care of that as soon as possible. 
13 The condition of your release is that that 
14 appointment is set up this week and that you 
15 follow through with the domestic violence 
16 evaluation. 
17 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
18 MS. BUTTRAM: Your Honor, are you going to 
19 be ordering an evaluation? 
20 THE COURT: I will also order an alcohol 
21 evaluation, and the defense may choose to order 
22 the alcohol evaluation. The defendant needs to 
23 provide the order for the domestic violence 
24 evaluation. The appointment does have to be done 
25 this week. 
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1 MR. MARTENS: As we were sitting here, I was 
2 writing down the information of Tom Wilson for 
3 him. 
4 THE COURT: What I run into is problems with 
5 people not taking care of it quickly enough, and 
6 so I'm just going to make that a condition of your 
7 release. It will cause you to lose your bond 
8 unless you get that appointment set up this week. 
9 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
10 THE COURT: We will have that August 24th at
 
11 3 for sentencing. Fill out the questionnaire. I
 
12 get the State's side of the case, so you want to
 
13 make sure I get your side.
 
14 MR. MARTENS: Where he is out of custody,
 
15 does he need an order to do that? He can just
 
16 make an appointment.
 
17 THE COURT: Tom Wilson likes an order. You
 




20 MR. MARTENS: Okay.
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1 BOISE, IDAHO 
2 Monday, August 24, 2009, 3:00 p.m. 
3 
4 THE COURT: The presentence investigator has 
5 requested a continuance on this, so I will set 
6 this over for September 9th at 4 o'clock. 
7 MR. MARTENS: I've got a conflict that day, 
8 Your Honor. 
9 THE COURT: I could set it for September 8th 
10 at 4 o'clock, or 4:30. 
11 MR. MARTENS: 4:30 would work. 
12 THE COURT: All right, I will set it for 
13 September 8th at 4:30. That's a Tuesday. 
14 MS. MORRISON: And, Your Honor, that's 4:30? 
15 THE COURT: Um-hmm. 
16 THE COURT: Anything else? 
17 MS. MORRISON: No, Your Honor. 
18 MR. MARTENS: Thank you, Your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: All right. I'll see you, then, 
20 on September 8th at 4:30 p.m. 
21 THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am. 
22 MR. MARTENS: That will be fine, Your Honor. 
23 I have the evaluation here that she was looking 
24 for, so we should be in good shape. 
25 THE COURT: Well -- oka . Get that ri ht to 
25 
BOISE, IDAHO 
Tuesday, September 8, 2009, 5:30 p.m. 
THE COURT: All right, I will take up State 
versus Jeffrey Murray. Sorry to make you wait. I 
was considerably longer than I anticipated, but 
that seems to happen sometimes. 
The defendant is here before the court 
for sentencing. He had previously been arraigned. 
At the time of his arraignment, he was 
advised of the nature of the charges against him, 
also of his rights, including his right to plead 
not guilty, to have a jury trial, to confront and 
cross-examine the witnesses against him, to put on 
evidence if he desired to do so, and to exercise 
the privilege against self-incrimination. 
He was told that he would give up these 
rights, along with his defenses, if he pled 
guilty. 
In this case, he did plead guilty. He 
pled guilty to the Second Amended Information, one 
count of domestic violence. 
The State was going to recommend a 
sentence of three plus seven for ten, to be 
Jail. 
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1 The defendant was required as part of 
2 the plea bargain agreement to get a domestic 
3 violence evaluation, which he did and which I have 
4 reviewed, so we talked about the plea. 
5 It was a valid plea. I did accept it. 
6 I have received presentence materials, which I 
7 have reviewed in detail, and I will take up any 
8 changes or corrections. 
9 Any by the State? 
10 MS. BU1TRAM: Your Honor, I don't know how 
11 this typically works, but in the domestic violence 
12 evaluation, Tom Wilson notes that the victim was 
13 incarcerated, and I believe that should be 
14 "unavailable," not "incarcerated." 
15 THE COURT: Okay. 
16 MS. BUITRAM: She was in a different 
17 situation than that. 
18 THE COURT: All right, the record will 
19 reflect your remarks on that, and I will make a 
20 notation that the State advises me that is 
21 "unavailable," not "incarcerated." 
22 MS. BU1TRAM: Thank you. 
23 THE COURT: And that was on -- okay, and 
24 that was on page 3? 
25 MS. BUTTRAM: Yes, Your Honor. 
28 
1 I shouldn't say impose it, order that and suspend 
2 it with 120 days in the Ada County jail forthwith. 
3 I'm asking that you order that the 
4 defendant obtain the treatment that the evaluator 
5 suggests, as well as any treatment that his 
6 probation officer orders. 
7 We are asking for a no-contact order 
8 with the victim and, Your Honor, the victim has 
9 also asked that the no-eontact cover her two minor 
10 children and ex-husband. She said he made treats 
11 to her before regarding her family. 
12 She also stays at that residence at 
13 times, and that's the reason for my request on the 
14 no-contact. 
15 $1,553 restitution. That money would 
16 be for the paramedics and the 5t. Luke's medical 
17 bill. 
18 THE COURT: Counsel for the defense? 
19 MR. MARTENS: Your Honor, we too would ask 
20 that you follow the agreement. I have reviewed 
21 the presentence investigation, and like the 
22 prosecutor said, there is -- some of the facts are 
23 disturbing. 
24 Some of the things that may be illegal, 
25 my client has engaged in in his personal life or .. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. 
2 Okay, any by the defense? 
3 MR. MARTENS: Your Honor, we will just bring 
4 it up in argument. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Will there be 
6 testimony today? 
7 MS. BUITRAM: No, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Will there be testimony by the 
9 defense? 
10 MR. MARTENS: No, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Then I will hear the arguments 
12 of counsel. 
13 MS. BUTTRAM: Your Honor, this defendant has 
14 very little criminal history and no prior 
15 felonies. 
16 At the time the State entered into this 
17 agreement, the State had no knowledge of these 
18 other women, and so, obviously, that information 
19 that came out in the PSI is very disturbing, but I 
20 believe it further supports the State's 
21 recommendation and belief that jail time is 
22 appropriate in this case, as well as the domestic 
23 violence treatment as recommended by Tom Wilson. 
24 So, Your Honor, the State is asking 
25 this court to impose a three-plus-seven for ten-­
29 
1 probably they are disturbing even to me. I find 
2 it quite disgusting. 
3 But at the same time, the question is, 
4 is whether he's out there breaking the law 
5 habitually, and I think there is some question -­
6 l think it's real questionable that that's the 
7 case, that he is out breaking the law as a 
8 habitual offender. 
9 Irregardless of that presentence 
10 investigation, the thing -- I just kind of had an 
11 overall problem with the presentence investigation 
12 and Tom Wilson's report myself, just simply 
13 because that he got a letter from his estranged 
14 wife, and they just kind of ran with it and dug 
15 and dug and dug. 
16 And a lot of the information in here, 
17 I'm not trying to make excuses for my client. I 
18 think a lot of things he does is disgusting. But 
19 at the same time, he admits to it -- at the same 
20 time a lot of the stuff in the presentence 
21 investigation, there is -- there are no backups or 
22 bases. 
23 It's just one person says that somebody 
24 committed suicide. It must have been Jeff 
25 Murray's fault. It's just kind of baseless. I 
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1 didn't find the presentence investigation or Tom 
2 Wilson's report to be that helpful in this case. 
3 Quite simply, everything seems to be 
4 based on one letter and then expanded upon from 
5 that one letter. It's a little disturbing to me. 
6 I think that he does need treatment. I 
7 would hope that treatment can maybe straighten him 
8 out. I think, like I say, some of the things he 
9 does is kind of disgusting. 
10 I think a no-contact order is 
11 appropriate, and I think treatment's appropriate 
12 in this case. 
13 We would ask that you follow the 
14 agreement and order that he get the treatment that 
15 he probably needs and leave the no-contact order 
16 in place. 
17 He doesn't have any desire to be around 
18 the victim or her husband at this point. So 
19 that's what we would ask for, Your Honor. Thank 
20 you. 
21 THE COURT: Mr. Murray, your comments? 
22 THE DEFENDANT: I agree with Mr. Martens. 
23 THE COURT: Is there any legal cause why we 
24 should not proceed? 
25 MS. BUTIRAM: No, Your Honor. 
32 
1 That's clearly verifiable by other 
2 people. This is observations of the 
3 investigators. Based on her version, there was an 
4 argument. She struck the defendant, and then he 
s ramps it up. 
6 When he is confronted with the more 
7 significant version, he basically says, "Well, it 
8 happened as a result of rough sex, and that it was 
9 not of concern." 
10 The presentence investigator looked 
11 into his past background and history with respect 
12 to domestic violence, and as counsel has pointed 
13 out, his ex-wife did write to the court outlining 
14 a pretty horrific situation of domestic violence 
15 and abuse. 
16 It is sometimes difficult for courts to 
17 know how to weigh allegations of domestic violence 
18 or abuse from ex-spouses because, unfortunately, 
19 many times courts do get allegations that are not 
20 substantiated or are difficult to substantiate. 
21 Usually those allegations are made in 
22 domestic courts in connection with child custody 
23 issues. That seems to be a situation that can 
24 sometimes draw out allegations that are sometimes 
25 difficult to consider and are certain! sometimes 
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1 MR. MARTENS: No, Your Honor.
 
2 THE COURT: Well, this case comes before the
 




5 The presentence materials received by
 
6 the court indicated that not only was there an
 
7 incident -- a troubling incident of domestic
 
8 violence in and of itself, but that it appeared to
 
9 be part of a much more extensive and long-lasting
 
10 pattern of behavior. 
11 The particular case -- in this 
12 particular case, paramedics were summoned to 
13 assist the victim. She had lost consciousness. 
14 At several times, she complained of coughing up 
15 blood. They observed swelling on her throat. 
16 The defendant's initial version was 
17 that he was just helping her - later said that 
18 there had been, in his expression, rough sex, and 
19 that is why she was injured in the fashion that 
20 she was. 
21 The investigators in this case noted 
22 the victim's extreme reluctance to discuss what 
23 had occurred. The victim wouldn't talk about it 
24 until she was assured that the defendant was not 
25 nearb . 
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1 difficult to verify.
 
2 However, in this case the presentence
 
3 investigator went considerably farther than just
 
4 getting information from the defendant's ex-wife.
 
5 The presentence investigator also
 
6 discussed this with police authorities in the
 
7 state in which the defendant was residing at the
 
8 time of these prior incidents of domestic
 
9 violence, and also stalking behavior of other
 
10 girlfriends or significant others occurred. 
11 The letter that we received from the 
12 prior ex-wife of the defendant, to summarize it, 
13 was that he had been viciously abusive to her. At 
14 one point, he cut her breast with a knife. She 
15 cried. He laughed, and he had sex with her. 
16 This information is verified by a 
17 police officer to whom he shows pornographic 
18 pictures of the woman that the police officer is 
19 later to determine is, in fact, his then wife, who 
20 was the author of the letter. 
21 And in those pictures, it is clear that 
22 there is blood around her mouth and nose, she's 
23 tied up, her hands are purple, her breast has been 
24 tied in such a way that it's turning purple, and 
25 he told the olice officer who saw these ver 
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1 troubling pictures that it was just rough sex. 
2 He also has admitted to other police 
3 authorities of slashing the tires of his either 
4 girlfriend's car or her boyfriend's car, a car in 
5 the household of a woman who previously had been 
6 involved with him. 
7 Another girlfriend reported him 
8 breaking a porch light. That wasn't able to be 
9 confirmed. That woman later committed suicide, 
10 and I don't think it's fair to say -- who knows 
11 why she was that unhappy, and I don't think that's 
12 fair to attribute anything to anybody in 
13 particular. 
14 Tom Wilson also engaged in a fairly 
15 extensive investigation into a domestic violence 
16 in the defendant's past. Tom Wilson concludes 
17 from the information that he obtains that the 
18 defendant minimizes the extent of his past 
19 violence. 
20 He may have alcohol issues, which he 
21 minimizes, because there are some indications that 
22 some of the violence and abuse occurs in the 
23 context of alcohol abuse. 
24 Tom Wilson concludes he does have poor 
25 impulse control. He does additional checking, 
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1 is coming straight from his own admissions. It is 
2 quite -- it is without question that he has 
3 violated past protection orders. 
4 And there is also independent evidence 
5 by police officers of sadistic violent behavior 
6 towards his sexual partners which has carried a 
7 risk of serious bodily injury or possible even 
8 death to these sexual partners. 
9 I don't think the defendant is 
10 manageable on probation. I also think there is a 
11 high risk of reoffense. 
12 I think the defendant clearly shows 
13 that he minimizes his risk to others, that he 
14 thinks it's no big deal, and I think it is not 
15 inconceivable that someone could die during these 
16 so-called consensual events or very likely suffer 
17 severe bodily injury. 
18 I cannot follow this plea bargain 
19 agreement. I don't think it is sufficiently 
20 protective of the public. I think the defendant 
21 needs a penalty for what he has done to this 
22 particular victim in this case. 
23 She lost consciousness multiple times. 
24 She was coughing up blood. She showed visible 
25 external injuries, and it is not an isolated 
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1 additional verification. He, of course, brings 
2 all the information to the attention of the 
3 defendant, who says that he last engaged in, or he 
4 terms as rough sex, and Tom Wilson concludes that 
5 the defendant is of medium to high risk to 
6 reoffend. 
7 The presentence investigator who, in my 
8 view, did a thorough job of trying to track down 
9 other sources of information, advises the court 
10 that the defendant shows no remorse over any harm 
11 to past Significant others. 
12 It is clear that he has violated past 
13 protection orders when some of these incidents of 
14 domestic violence occurred, and there is a pattern 
15 of disregarding past protection orders. 
16 There is sadistic sexual behavior with 
17 multiple partners carrying a Significant risk to 
18 their safety. 
19 My review of this entire picture is 
20 that the defendant is a person who's exhibited 
21 some significant danger towards others in his 
22 past. 
23 He will not be manageable on probation 
24 because of his past disregard to protection orders 
25 by his own admission, and some of this misconduct 
37 
1 incident. 
2 It's not one time with a person who 
3 maybe drank too much and was kind of blowing up 
4 and doing something stupid that that person has 
5 never done before, but it's part of a pattern of 
6 extreme sadistic behavior towards partners. 
7 And I think there's a very high risk 
8 for reoffense. I think, for the deterrence of the 
9 defendant, for the imposition of a penalty, and 
10 for wrongful conduct, and to encourage the 
11 defendant to re-think how he characterizes his 
12 behavior, I think a penalty is appropriate. 
13 I don't think this is a case where the 
14 defendant is amenable to probation because of the 
15 number of violations of protective orders, and the 
16 violence in his past relationships is of such a 
17 magnitude that I am concerned that there could be 
18 death or severe bodily injury. 
19 Therefore, I'm imposing a sentence of 
20 three years fixed, followed by seven years 
21 indeterminate, for a ten-year sentence. 
22 You do have 42 days in which to appeal. 
23 It is not the court's intention to either retain 
24 jurisdiction or to suspend the sentence and place 
25 the defendant on probation. 
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1 I think a penalty's appropriate, and I 
2 think a penalty may be all that can happen to 
3 convince the defendant to change his ways before 
4 somebody dies. Court will recess. 
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5 I, Susan G. Gambee, Official Court 
6 Reporter, County of Ada, State of Idaho, hereby 
7 certify: 
8 That I am the reporter who took the 
9 proceedings had in the above-entitled action in 
10 machine shorthand and thereafter the same was 
11 reduced into typewriting under my direct 
12 supervision; and 
13 That to the extent the audio was audible 
14 and intelligible, the foregoing transcript 
15 contains a full, true, and accurate record of the 
16 proceedings had in the above and foregoing cause, 
17 which was heard at Boise, Idaho. 
18 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set 
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Guilty Plea Advisory Form for use in Judge Bail's JUL 1 3 2009 ~ 
Court J. DAV ~ JAIl 
Defendant's Name: -S~ rrK.£ t( :DAde J)1 U I!K-fJ r El, 
Date: 7// :fIt) t:if 
Case Number: cg .... tPE - ;LOo~ -C'OO~I ()2. 
'-­ ..........~ 
Nature of Charges: 
o Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty: /0 .~ 
_______Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty: / 
_______Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty: _ 
_______Minimum & Maximum Possible Penalty: _ 
STATEMENT OF RlGHTS & EXPLANATION OF WAIVERS BY PLEA 
OF GUILTY 
(PLEASE INITIAL EACH RESPONSE) 
1. You have the right to remain silent. You do not have to say anything J
 
about the crime(s) you are accused of committing. I f you elected to have a r:;:r:~
 
trial, the state could not call you as a witness or ask you any questions.
 
However, anything you do say can be used as evidence against you in court.
 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to remain silent 
about the charge I am pleading guilty to both before and after trial. r;t
2. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of 
guilty to the crime(s) in this case unless you are waiving your rights unde ,';14 
State v. Estrada. Unless you waive your rights under Estrada, even after 
pleading guilty, you will still have the right to refuse to answer any 
question or to provide any information that might tend to show you 
committed some other crime(s). You can also refuse to answer or provide 
any information that might tend to increase the punishment for the crime(s) 
to which you are pleading guilty. 
I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still haveifl
 
the right to remain silent with respect to any other crime(s) and with respe . 'fJ1.
 




3. You have the right to be represented by an attorney. If you want an )IJ/J-d 
attorney and cannot pay for one, you can ask the judge for an attorney who '1/( 
will be paid by the county. 
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4. You are presumed to be innocent. You would be found guilty if: I) you iJ;n 
plead guilty in front of the judge, or 2) you are found guilty at a jury trial. tTl 
~ understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to be presumed //"1
innocent. 
S. You have the right to a speedy and public jury trial. A jury trial is a court/, /VI 
hearing to determine whether you are guilty or not guilty of the charge(s) /' ( 
brought against you. In a jury trial, you have the right to present evidence in 
your defense and to testify in your own defense. The state must convince 
each and every one of the jurors of your guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to a speedy and / ~ 
public jury trial. 
6. You have the right to confront the witnesses against you. This occurs 
during a jury trial where the state must prove its case by calling witnesses to ;/ /JA 
testify under oath in front of you, the jury, and your attorney. Your attorney p'('( 
could then cross-examine (question) each witness. You could also call your 
own witnesses of your choosing to testify concerning your guilt or 
innocence. If you do not have the funds to bring those witnesses to court, the 
state will pay the cost of bringing your witnesses to court. 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to confront the ;j# 
witnesses against me, an present witnesses and evidence in my defense. ~v{
QllESTIONS REGARDING PLEA 
(Please answer every question. Uyou do not understand a question 
consult your attorney before answering.> 
PLEASE CIRCLE ONE 
I. Do you read and write the English language?@NO 
If not, have you been provided with an interpreter to 
help you till out this torm? YES NO 
2. \Vhat is your age? !iJ..... ,M tlelfY 
3. \Vhat is your true legal name? :s Cr::"r ~£V ylltv£' /' ciA 
4. How far did you go in school? i2 of- SO~C C oU".£~£ c-~I'i $"5"£5 
If you did not complete high school, have you received 
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IfiCt was the diagnosis and when was it made? ~
 
"€ /2// fe) ~~ ,q~~ fF 
II. I understand that my plea agreement is a non-binding plea agreement. 
This means that the court is not bound by the agreement or any 
sentencing recommendations, and may impose any sentence authorized 
by law, up to the maximum sentence for any offense. Because the court 
is not bound by the agreement, if the district court chooses not to follow 
the agreement, I will not have the right to withdraw my guilty plea. 





~ :r~t ?:21;~fF#.1: 
e Co - -/ ' , D ,,'I c ,S"'i ~ ./JIH.. 
7. Are you c rrently prescribed any edication? YE NO ~ W'/frJ. 
If so, have you taken your pr~ecri tion medicatIOn 
during the past 24 hours? YE N 
8. In the last 24 hours, have you taken y medications 
or drugs, or drank any alcoholic beverages 
which you believe affect your ability to make a reasoned 
and informed decision in this case? YES(NO') 
9. Is there any other reason that you wou~ unable 
to make a reasoned and informed decision in this 
case?YES@ 
10. Is your guilty plea the result of a plea agreement?@NO 
If so, what are the terms of that plea agreement? (If 
available, a written plea agreement should be attached 





guilty to more than one crime? YES@ 
If so, do you understand that your sentences for each 
crime could be ordered to be served either concurrently 
(at the same time) or consecutively (one after 
the other)? YES NO 
13. Is this a conditional guilty plea in which YOu~a 
reserving your right to appeal any pre-trial issues YE N~ _(' -(}-;;;;'~~ 
If so, what issue are you reserving the right to appea ?J/;'tL ~ f1 ~ 
14. Have you waived your right to appeal your judgment 
 




15. Have any other promises been made to you which
 
have influenced your decision to plead guilty? YES@ 
If so, what are those promises? 
16.Do you feel you have had sufficient time to discuss 
your case with your attorney?@NO 
17. Have you told your attorney everything you know 
about the crime?@§)NO 
18. Is there anything you have requested your attorney 
to do that has not been done? YES @ 
rfyes, please 
explain. _ 
19. Your attorney can get various items from the prosecutor 
relating to your case. This may include police 
reports, witness statements, tape recordings, photographs, 
reports of scientific testing, etc. This is called 
discovery. Have you reviewed the evidence provided to 
your attorney during discovery?@§)NO 
20.Have you told your attorney about any witnesses 
who would show your innocence? ~NO 
21. Do you understand that by pleading guilty you 
will waive any defenses, both factual and legal, that 
















22. Are there any motions or other requests for relief CI 
that you believe should still be filed in this case? YES ~ 
If so, what motions or 
requests? _ 
23. Do you understand that if you enter an unconditional
 
guilty plea in this case you will not be able to
 
challenge any rulings that came before the guilty plea
 
including: 1) any searches or seizures that occurred in
 
your case, 2) any issues concerning the method or
 
manner of your arrest, and 3) any issues about any ~
 
statements you may have made to law enforcement? ~ NO
 
24. Do you understand that when you plead guilty,
 
you are admitting the truth of each and every allegation
 




25. Are you currently on probation or parole? YES@)
 
If so, do you understand that a plea of guilty in this
 
case could be the basis of a violation of that probation
 
or parole? YES NO
 
26.Are you aware that if you are not a citizen of the
 
United States, the entry of a plea or making of factual
 
admissions could have consequences of deportation
 
or removal, inability to obtain legal status in the
 




27.00 you know whether the crime to which you will
 
plead guilty would require you_~ister as a sex
 
offender? (I.C. § 18-8304) YE~
 
28. Are you aware that if you plead guilty you may be
 




29.Have you ag;eeato pay restitution to any other
 
party as a condition of your plea agreement? YEs@>
 
If so, to whom?

30. Is there a mandatory driver's license suspension 
as a result ofa guilty plea in this case? YES® 
If so, for how long must your license 
be suspended? _ 





































mandatory domestic violence, substance abuse, or
 
psychosexual evaluation is~euired? (I.C. §§ 18­

918(7)(a),-8005(9),-83 17) ES NO
 
32. Are you pleading guilty a crime for which you
 
may be required to pay the costs ofprose~'nand
 
investigation? (I.C. § 37-2732A(K)) YE N
 
33. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for w ich you
 
will be required to submit a DNA sample to the state?
 
(I.C. § 19-5506) YES@ 
34. Are you pleading guilty to a crime for which the
 
court could impose a fine for a crime of violence of up
 




35. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a 
felony, during the period of your sentence, you will 
lo@r right to vote in Idaho? (10. CONST. art. 6, § 
3) ES NO 
36. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a 
felony, during the period ofyour sentence, you will 
lose your right to hO~bliC office in Idaho? (IO. 
CONST. art. 6, § 3) NO 
37. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a 
felony, during the period of your. sentence, you will 
lose your right to perform jury service in Idaho? (10. 
CONST. art. 6, § 3)@NO 
38. Do you understand that if you plead guilty to a 
felony you will lose your righ~tchase,possess, or 
carry firearms? (I.C. § 18-310 YES 0 
39. Do you understand that no 0 ,ncluding your 
attorney, can force you to plead guilty in this case?~ NO 
40. Are you entering your plea freely and voluntarilf@§JNO 
41. Are you pleading guilty because you did commit 
the acts alleged in the information or indictment? @NO 
42. If you were provided with an interpreter to help 
you fill out this form, have you had any trouble understanding 
your interpreter? YES@ 
43. Have you had any trouble answering any of the 
questions in this form which you could not resolve by 
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I have answered the questions on each page of this Guilty Plea Advisory
 
form truthfully, I understand all of the questions and answers in this fonn,
 
and I have discussed each question and answer with my attorney, and have
 
completed this fonn freely and voluntarily. Furthermore, no one
 
has threatened me to do so.
 
Dated this day of~, 20/) q .
 
f1 ~'f rJ ~. J.L+­
DEFENDAN
 
I hereby acknowledge that I have Iscussed, in detail, the foregoing 
questions and answers 
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~o i~dictment in stabbing dlltells woman remains in jail on a".rge Ijacksons... Page 1 of 1 
jacksonsun.com
First in News. 
No indictment in stabbing 
death: Bells woman remains 
in jail on assault charge 
BY STANLEY DUNLAP 
SDUNLAP@JACKSONSUN.COM 
- Stanley Dunlap, 425-9668 
• October 6, 2010 
A Crockett County jUry declined this week to indict a 
woman on a charge of second-degree murder after 
her boyfriend was killed following a fight in July. 
The grand jury returned the no true bill on Monday 
for Regina Murray, who had been charged by 
authorities in the death of Greg Evans, according to 
the Crockett County Circuit Court Clerk's Office. 
Murray was accused of stabbing Evans, 47, in the 
leg with a kitchen knife after the two got into a 
physical fight in their home on Tenn. 88 in Bells on 
July 13. According to the Tennessee Bureau of 
Investigation, a medical examiner ruled Evans bled 
to death from the wound on his leg. 
Murray remains in jail on charges stemming from a 
separate incident in which police say she threatened 
Evans' mother with a kitchen knife, Murray will 
appear in court Monday on the charges of 
aggravated assault and assault in the August 2009 
incident. 
District Attorney General Garry Brown said 
prosecutors are still deciding whether to bring the 
second-degree murder charge before a second 
grand jury, 
Murray's Public Defender Jamie Berkley said, 
"Obviously what happened was tragic, but in our 
investigation of the case, we think the grand jury 
made the right decision and hope it stands," 
The couple had a history of domestic disputes, 
according to court records. 
Evans was found guilty of misdemeanor domestic 
assault April 15 after he hit Murray, according to 
court records. 
Evans and Murray both were charged with domestic 
assault after a September 2009 incident, but the 
char es later were dismissed. That affidavit states 
Evans dragged Murray Qut of the house, leaving her 
with knots on her head and abrasions. According to 
the affidavit charging Murray, Evans said she had 
become irate and was throwing things. He then 
grabbed her by the arm and pushed her away, but 
she followed him to a nearby shop and threatened 
him with a tire iron. 
Evans also was charged in an incident in which he 
threatened to kill his mother, according to court 
records. 
(Murray) 
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• , ­ FILED 
THE COURT 
October 27 2010 at 04:49 PM 
J. D YARRO, CLERK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
CASE NO. CV-PC-2010-21310 
Plaintiff(5) 
JEFFREY MURRAY, PLAINTIFF 
vs CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
STATE OF IDAHO, DEFENDANT 
Defendant(s) 
I, J. DAVID NAVARRO, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have mailed, 
by United States Mail, one copy of the: VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF as notice pursuant to Rule 77 (d) I.R.C.P. to each of the parties 
or attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows: 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
INTEROFFICE MAIL 
DENNIS BENJAMIN 
ATTORNY AT LAW 
HAND DELIVERED 
Dated:Wednesday, October 27, 2010 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the Court 
/ CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 1/1V Court Rere,",,,, 10/27/2010 000038








OCT 29 2010 
~2t~~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
























A Petition for Post Conviction Relief having been filed herein and it appearing therefrom 
that a transcript of the Sentencing before the District Court is required to resolve the issues 
raised; 
IT IS ORDERED that pursuant to LC.R. 54 that a transcript be prepared of the Entry of 
Plea hearing dated July 13, 2009, and the Sentencing hearing dated September 8, 2009, on case 
CRFE09006102, at the expense of Ada County. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the Clerk of the District Court shall immediately 
serve copies of this order on all parties or their attorneys, and the trial court transcriber. 
Dated this 29th day of October, 2010. 






















CERTIFICATE OF MAn..ING 
I hereby certify that on this 29th day of October, 2010, I mailed (served) a true and 
correct copy of the within instrument to: 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR 
INTERDEPT MAn.. 
DENNIS BENJAMIN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 2772 
BOISE ID 83701 
COURT REPORTER-SUSAN GAMBEE 
INTERDEPT MAn.. 
J. DAVID NAVARRO 
Clerk of the District Court 





ISBA# 4199 NOV U82010 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk
303 W. Bannock By J. RANDALL 
DEPUTYP.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COlJRT FOR THE FOURTH JlJDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JEFFREY MURRAY, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) CASE NO. CV-PC-l021310 
) 
vs. ) REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
) 




Petitioner, Jeffrey Murray, asks this Court, pursuant to I.R.E. 20l(d), to take judicial 
notice of the transcripts, files, affidavits, lodged documents, Presentence Investigation Report, 
exhibits and record in the case of State v. Jeffrey JII!urray, Ada County CR-FE-2009-6l02, 
including the guilty plea questionnaire and the transcripts of the change of plea hearing and 
sentencing hearing. (Copies of which are attached to the petition for post-conviction relief.) 
Respectfully submitted thi~'""'fI)ay of November, 2010. 
U.lAA,,-ts.:e ~~---
Dennis Benj amin • 
Attorney for Jeffrey Murray 
1· REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
ORIGINAL
 000041












CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thi~y of November, 2010, I caused a true and 




to:	 Tessie Buttram 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front St., #3191 













Ada County Prosecuting Attorney J. DAVID NAVARRO, C;er~
 












IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JEFFREY MURRAY, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) Case No. CV-PC-2010-21310 
) 
vs. ) ANSWER TO PETITION FOR 
) POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 







COMES NOW, Respondent, the State of Idaho, by and through its counsel of 
record, the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, and in ANSWER to Petitioner's 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, admits, denies, alleges and moves to dismiss the 
Petition as follows: 
I. DEFENSES 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Petitioner's Verified Petition raises no genume Issue of material fact. 
Therefore, the Petition should be summarily dismissed pursuant to I.C. §19-4906(b), (c). 

























The Petitioner failed to raise the issues contained in his Verified Petition on 
appeal. Therefore, these issues are barred, and the Petition should be summarily 
dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901(b). 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Petitioner's Verified Petition fails to establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel; further Petitioner has failed 
to establish that the attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and the conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 
process that the conviction and sentence relied upon has produced an unjust result. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, (1984); State v. Ivey, 123 Idaho 77,844 P.2d 
706 (1992). Therefore, said allegations should be dismissed. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Respondent denies each and every allegation of Petitioner's Verified Petition not 
herein specifically and expressly admitted. 
1. Answering Paragraphs 1-7 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent 
admits the allegations contained therein. 
2. Answering Paragraph 8 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent has 
insufficient information about said allegation contained therein and denies the allegation; 
3. Answering Paragraphs 9-19 of the Petitioner's Verified Petition, said 
Respondent admits the allegation contained therein. 
4. Answering Paragraph 20 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent 
denies the allegation contained therein. Paragraph 11 of the Guilty Plea Advisory Form 
specifically notified the Petitioner that the Court was not bound by the agreement and in 
fact could impose a sentence up to the maximum prescribed by law. 
ANSWER TO VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF (MURRAY 




   
 
5. Answering Paragraphs 21-22 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent 
has insufficient information about said allegation contained therein and denies the 
allegation. 
6. Answering Paragraph 23 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent 
denies the allegation contained therein and refers the Court back to Paragraph 4 of this 
Answer. 
7. Answering Paragraph 24 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent 
admits the allegation contained therein. 
8. Answering Paragraph 25 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent 
denies the allegation contained therein and refers the Court back to Paragraph 4 of this 
Answer. 
9. Answering Paragraphs 26-27 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent 
admits the allegations contained therein. 
10. Answering Paragraph 28 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent 
denies the allegation contained therein. 
11. Answering Paragraph 29 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent has 
insufficient information about said allegation contained therein and denies the allegation. 
12. Answering Paragraph 30 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent re­
alleges the same answers provided above. 
13. Answering Paragraph 31 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent 
denies the allegation contained therein. 
14. Answering Paragraph 32 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent has 
insufficient information about said allegation contained therein and denies the allegation. 
15. Answering Paragraph 33 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent 
admits the allegation contained therein. 
16. Answering Paragraphs 34-37 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent 
has insufficient information about said allegation contained therein and denies the 
allegation. 
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17. Answering Paragraph 38 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent 
admits the allegation contained therein. Per the plea agreement the Petitioner was 
required to obtain a domestic violence evaluation. 
18. Answering Paragraphs 39-55 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent 
has insufficient infonnation about said allegations contained therein and denies the 
allegations. 
19. Answering Paragraph 56 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent 
denies the allegation contained therein. Per Exhibit C attached to Petitioner's Verified 
Petition the incident alleged here did not occur until September 26, 2009; Petitioner's 
sentencing hearing took place on September 8, 2009. 
20. Answering Paragraph 57-58 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent 
admits the allegations contained therein. 
21. Answering Paragraph 59 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent has 
insufficient infonnation about said allegation contained therein and denies the allegation. 
22. Answering Paragraph 38 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent 
admits the portion of the allegation in sentence 1; said Respondent denies the remainder, 
in that the article states that Petitioner's wife "was accused of stabbing Evans," not that 
she "killed her boyfriend, and that "prosecutors are still deciding whether to bring the 
second-degree murder charge before a second grand jury. " 
23. Answering Paragraphs 61-68 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent 
has insufficient infonnation about said allegations contained therein and denies the 
allegations. 
24. Answering Paragraph 69 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent re­
alleges the same answers provided above. 
25. Answering Paragraphs 70-73 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent 
has insufficient infonnation about said allegations contained therein and denies the 
allegations. 
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26. Answering Paragraph 74 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent 
denies the allegation contained therein. 
27. Answering Paragraph 75 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent 
admits the allegation contained therein. 
28. Answering Paragraphs 76-83 of Petitioner's Verified Petition, said Respondent 
has insufficient information about said allegations contained therein and/or denies the 
allegations. 
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WHEREFORE, the Respondent prays this Court to consider the Petitioner's 
Petition, the Respondent's Answer, the pleadings and record in the above-entitled case 
and in criminal case CR-FE-2009-0006102, and the pleadings and record before the 
Idaho Court of Appeals and prays for relief as follows: 
A. That Petitioner's Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief be 
denied; 
B.	 That Petitioner's Verified Petition be dismissed; 
C.	 For such other and further relief as the Court deems necessary in the 
premIses. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This .1JL day of November 2010. 
GREG H. BOWER 
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney 
r Ij
VL,art4~~ 
By:""' Tessie Buttram 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this d.~ day of November 2010, I served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST­
CONVICTION RELIEF to: Dennis Benjamin, Nevin Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP, 
303 W. Bannock, PO Box 2772, Boise, Idaho 83701, by depositing in the U.S. mail, 
postage prepaid. 
Laurel Thomas, Legal Assistant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JEFFREY MURRAY, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) CASE NO. CV-PC-102131O 
) 
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) REQUEST FOR DISMISSAL 




Petitioner, Jeffrey Murray, objects to the State's "motion" for dismissal found within its 
Answer for the following reasons. 
To begin, a request for dismissal made within an Answer is not a proper motion for 
summary dismissal. Saykharnchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995). All 
the State requests in its introductory paragraph and in its prayer for relief is for the petition to be 
dismissed or denied. Therefore, the State has failed to make a proper motion for summary 
disposition under I.e. § 19-4906(c). 
In Saykharnchone, the petitioner argued that the district court erred in dismissing his 
application because he did not get the twenty-day notice required under I.e. § 19-4906(b). The 
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State responded that the twenty-day notice was not required because it had made a motion to 
dismiss under I.e. § 19-4906(c). The Supreme Court rejected this argument because the State 
never filed a motion to dismiss. It only requested that the Court dismiss the petition in the 
Answer. "Under the circumstances," the Court wrote, "we do not believe the state's general 
request in the Answer's prayer for relief can fairly constitute a 'motion.'" 127 Idaho at 322, 900 
P.2d at 798. "Here, the better practice would have been for the state to file a separate motion 
under subsection (c). But at a minimum, the state's prayer for relief in the Answer was deficient 
for not stating its grounds with particularity, and for not stating that it was the state's motion for 
summary disposition under I.e. § 19-4906(c)." [d. "Furthermore, when the state files an answer, 
as it did here, the petitioner can rightly expect the matter will go to an evidentiary hearing on the 
issues framed by the pleadings, unless the district court provides a twenty-day notice of intent to 
dismiss, or the state files a motion for summary disposition." [d. Accordingly, the Court vacated 
the order of dismissal. 
Saykhamchone was distinguished in Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 164 P.3d 798 
(2007). "Unlike the State's answer in Saykhamchone, the State in this case submitted not just an 
answer but a motion to dismiss. This document contained twenty-two pages of argument 
categorically addressing Workman's allegations, identified by number." The Court found this 
document was adequate to put "Workman on notice of the basis for the State's request that the 
petition be summarily dismissed." 144 Idaho at 524, 164 P.3d at 804. The Court went on to 
express its disapproval of the combination Answer/Motion. It wrote: 
While we conclude the State's answer and motion to dismiss in this case were 
technically sufficient under I.C. § 19-4906(c) and Saykhamchone, we reiterate our 
direction in Saykhamchone that the preferable practice is: (1) to file a motion 





separate from the answer, (2) to identify that motion as a motion for summary 
disposition, not a motion to dismiss, and (3) to use the language of I.C. 
19-4906(c) and cite that specific statutory provision in support of the motion for 
summary disposition. It should be absolutely clear to a defendant that the State is 
not just responding to a petition but is seeking summary disposition without an 
evidentiary hearing and without further notice to the defendant. 
Id. 
The pleading in this case is different than the combination AnswerIMotion for Summary 
Disposition filed in Workman and is more like the Answer filed in Saykhamchone. The State's 
pleading here is styled an Answer, it never identifies itself as a motion for summary dismissal 
and it fails to ask for summary dismissal in either the introductory paragraph or in the prayer for 
relief. And, as will be discussed in detail below, each of the State's four purported defenses are 
inadequately pleaded. The State's "First Affirmative Defense" fails to provide adequate notice 
for the basis of its motion. The State's "Second Affirmative Defense" fails "to use the language 
of I.C. 19-4906(c) and cite that specific statutory provision in support of the motion for summary 
disposition." The State's "Third Affirmative Defense" and "Fourth Defense" suffer from the 
same deficiency. In all of them, unlike Workman, the State fails to make any convincing 
argument in support of its request. Thus, it would be error under Saykhamchone to summarily 
dismiss under I.C. § 19-4906(c) without an adequate motion from the State. 
1. The State's First Affirmative Defense Is Not Stated with Sufficient Particularity. 
As recently stated by the Idaho Supreme Court: "Because a post-conviction relief 
proceeding is governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 
813,907 P.2d 783, 790 (1995); I.C. § 19-4907(a), a motion for summary disposition must 'state 
with particularity the grounds therefor.'" DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 601,200 P.3d 1148, 





1150 (2009), quoting Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995); 
LR.C.P. 7(b)(1). The State must state the basis for its motion to dismiss with reasonable 
particularity. Patton v. Patton, 88 Idaho 288,292, 399 P.2d 262,264-65 (1965). Notice is only 
sufficient if the other party cannot assert surprise or prejudice. [d. at 292,399 P.2d at 265; 
DeRushe, supra. 
Here, the State's "First Affirmative Defense" is a mere boilerplate allegation that 
"Petitioner's Verified Petition raises no genuine issue of material fact." This is plainly 
inadequate under DeRushe and does not set forth a reason for summary dismissal. (Furthermore, 
as will be discussed in Section 3 below, the petition does raise genuine issues of material fact.) 
2. The State's Second Affirmative Defense Is Without Merit. 
The State next argues the issues raised in the petition are barred because they were not 
raised on appeal. However, such a fai lure acts as a bar only if the issue could have been raised 
on appeal. Idaho Code § 19-4901(b) states, in relevant part, that "[a]ny issue which could have 
been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in post­
conviction proceedings[.]" (Emphasis added.) In this case, none of the issues raised in the 
petition could have been raised on appeal. Therefore, the 19-4901(b) defense is not applicable 
here. 
The first cause of action is that the plea of guilty was invalid because it was not knowing, 
intelligent and voluntary. Mr. Murray could not raise that claim on appeal because it requires 
that evidence outside the appellate record be presented to the Court. Further, as alleged in the 
petition, neither of Mr. Murray's counsel advised him that he could file a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea under LC.R. 33 and no such motion was ever filed. Thus, Mr. Murray could not have 






raised this claim because general issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Under 
State v. Perry, - Idaho -. - P.3d -,2010 WL 2880156 (2010), if an error is not objected to, it 
will only be reviewed by an appellate court if the defendant persuades "the appellate court that 
the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) 
plainly exists; and (3) was not harmless." Id, at 17. See also, State v. Green, 130 Idaho 503, 
506,943 P.2d 929, 931 (1997) ("If a defendant disputes that his guilty plea was voluntarily or 
knowingly made, or disputes any of the other factors listed above, he may move to have the 
guilty plea withdrawn pursuant to LC.R. 33(c) .... Thus, before this Court can decide whether a 
guilty plea was appropriately accepted, the issue must be preserved by the defendant by first 
moving to have the plea withdrawn."). 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals rejected the State's argument in Ricca v. State, 124 Idaho 
894,865 P.2d 985 (Ct. App.1993). In Ricca, the Court of Appeals held that a defendant may 
challenge the validity of a guilty plea during post-conviction proceedings, so long as the 
defendant failed to file a motion to withdraw guilty plea below. Id. at 896-97, 865 P.2d at 
987-88; see also, Mendiola v. State, - Idaho -, - P.3d -,2010 WL 4483675 *3 (Ct. App. 
November 10, 2010) ("Mendiola was not barred from raising claims challenging the validity of 
his guilty plea in his application for post-conviction relief. Therefore, the district court did not 
err in determining that Mendiola's claims regarding his guilty plea were properly before the 
district court."). 
Thus, the State's argument in this regard is not well-taken. 
The second cause of action is that counsel at the plea and sentencing hearings was 
constitutionally ineffective and the third cause of action is that counsel at post-trial proceedings 




was constitutionally ineffective. It is well established that claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel should not be raised on direct appeal. As explained in State v. Doe, 136 Idaho 427, 
434-35,34 P.3d 1110, 1117-18 (Ct. App.200l): 
Factual questions relating to the competency of counsel generally pose a dilemma 
for an appellate court attempting to review the record; in such circumstances a 
separate hearing usually is required. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
is an issue rarely appropriate on direct appeal from a judgment of conviction; 
rather it is usually reserved for post-conviction relief proceedings, where a more 
complete evidentiary record can be developed. The resolution of such factual 
issues for the first time on appeal, based upon a trial record in which competence 
of counsel was not at issue, is at best conjectural. Post-conviction counsel must 
have the ability to develop a separate evidentiary record on an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim, including the ability to call witnesses and present 
evidence in a separate civil proceeding. This Court has consistently held that the 
appropriate procedure for adult criminal defendants to bring an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim is through an application for post-conviction relief 
In this case, the record on appeal does not provide sufficient evidence to evaluate 
Doe's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Therefore, we conclude that any 
attempt to decide Doe's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal 
would be, at best, conjectural. 
State v. Doe, 136 Idaho at 43334 P.3d at 1116 (emphasis added; internal citations omitted); see 
also State v. Roberts, 129 Idaho 194, 197,923 P.2d 439, 442 (1996) ("Roberts' ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim is more appropriately considered through an application for 
post-conviction relief."). 
In short, the State's claim that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims should have 
been raised in direct appeal is frivolous and must be rejected. 
3. The State's Third Affirmative Defense Is Not Stated with Sufficient Particularity 
and is Otherwise Without Merit. 
The State's pleading is insufficient. 
The State's Third Affirmative Defense does not comply with the practice recommended 






in Saykhamchone and Workman because: (1) it is not a motion separate from the Answer, (2) it 
does not identify itself as a motion for summary disposition, and (3) it does not use the language 
of I.e. 19-4906(c) or cite that specific statutory provision. In fact, it does not cite to or quote any 
statutory provision, nor does it ask that the ineffective assistance of counsel claims be summarily 
dismissed. Thus, no proper motion for summary disposition is before this Court. 
Moreover, it is wrong when it claims that there is no genuine issue of material fact. 
In determining whether a motion for summary disposition is properly granted, a 
court must review the facts in a light most favorable to the petitioner, and 
determine whether they would entitle petitioner to relief if accepted as true. A 
court is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but need 
not accept the petitioner[']s conclusions. 
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793, 102 P.3d 1108, 1112 (2004), quoting Saykhamchone, 
127 Idaho at 321,900 P.2d at 797 (internal citations omitted). Accord Pizzllto v. State, 149 Idaho 
155,160,233 P.3d 86, 91 (2010). 
The guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary. 
First, Mr. Murray alleges that he was not aware at the time he entered the guilty plea that 
the Coul1 was not required to follow the terms of the plea agreement. Petition, <j[ 20. If true, the 
guilty plea is constitutionally invalid because it was not made knowingly, intelligently and 
voluntarily. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). "Whether a plea is voluntary and 
understood entails inquiry into three areas: (1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in the 
sense that he understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the 
defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial, to confront his accusers, 
and to refrain from incriminating himself; and (3) whether the defendant understood the 
consequences of pleading guilty." State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32,34,557 P.2d 626, 628 (1976). 






The plea here was not voluntary and understood because Mr. Murray did not know that the Court 
could reject the plea offer. 
The State in its Answer denies that allegation because "paragraph 11 of the Guilty Plea 
Advisory specifically notified the Petitioner that the Court was not bound by the agreement[.]" 
Answer, l)[ 4. However, the State ignores the allegation in l)[ 29 of the Petition: "Mr. Martens 
specifically told me that paragraph 11 did not apply to me because I was only to be sentenced to 
120 days." Moreover, the State ignores the fact that while every other paragraph in the guilty 
plea questionnaire required a response from the defendant, Mr. Murray did not answer that he 
understood the information contained in paragraph 11. See Exhibit B to Petition. In fact, Mr. 
Murray answered every applicable question and acknowledged every "Statement of Rights & 
Explanation of Waivers by Plea of Guilty" except paragraph 11. Taking all of Mr. Murray's 
factual allegations as true and all reasonable inference in his favor, the Petition raises a genuine 
question of material fact in this regard. 
Counsel was ineffective under State v. Woods. 
Next, the petition alleges that attorney Martens was ineffective for failing to advise Mr. 
Murray that he could have obtained a confidential domestic violence evaluation prior to 
sentencing and that Mr. Martens did not explain to him what rights he was waiving when he 
agreed to waive his rights under "State v. Estrada." Mr. Murray then alleges that: "Had I been so 
informed, I would have obtained my own confidential domestic violence evaluation prior to 
entering a plea of guilty." He also alleges that he only agreed to waive his rights under "State v. 
Estrada" because he thought that the Court was required to follow the plea agreement. In the 
Answer, the State admits that "[a]t the guilty plea hearing, the Court ordered that a domestic 
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violence evaluation be done and submitted to the Court." Petition l)[ 33; Answer l)[ 15. Further, 
the State admits that Mr. Murray was required to obtain a domestic violence evaluation as part of 
the plea agreement. Petition l)[ 38; Answer l)[ 17. 
Further, Mr. Martens did not take any steps to militate the effect of the very unfavorable 
evaluation. Mr. Murray alleges that the court-ordered evaluation reached its conclusions based 
upon misunderstandings of the facts and that Mr. Martens was in possession of the court-ordered 
evaluation prior to sentencing, but that Mr. Martens did not go over the court-ordered evaluation 
with Mr. Murray prior to sentencing. The Petition also alleges that Mr. Martens did not contact 
Mr. Wilson or take any actions to try to correct those factual misunderstandings in the court­
ordered evaluations. Nor did Mr. Martens inform Mr. Murray that he could get his own 
evaluation to rebut the findings in the court-ordered evaluation. Mr. Murray did not believe an 
additional evaluation was needed because he believed that the Court was bound to follow the 
plea agreement but he would have obtained another evaluation had he known the Court was not 
bound by the plea agreement. 
These facts set forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because reasonable 
professional performance required defense counsel in this case to seek and obtain a confidential 
and privileged domestic violence evaluation. This self-evident proposition was made explicit by 
State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 967 P.2d 702 (1998). In Wood, the defendant was charged with 
first-degree murder. Defense counsel arranged for the defendant to be evaluated by a 
psychiatrist. Prior to obtaining the psychiatrist's report, the defendant changed his plea to guilty. 
The Court then "ordered a pre-sentence investigation (PSI) and ordered that the report of defense 
psychiatric witness Dr. Vicky Gregory, be included in the PSI." Wood, 132 Idaho at 93, 967 P.2d 
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at 707. Defense counsel did not object to the inclusion of the report. When the report turned out 
to be unfavorable, defense counsel did not object to its inclusion in the PSI. At the sentencing 
hearing, the psychiatrist testified on behalf of the prosecution. Again, defense counsel did not 
object to the testimony. 
The Idaho Supreme Court held that the failure to object to the consideration of the report 
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" because: 1) defense counsel did not know 
whether the report would be favorable when he failed to object to the Court's order that it be 
included in the PSI; and 2) because defense counsel failed to object to the inclusion of the 
unfavorable report. Wood, 132 Idaho at 102, 967 P.2d at 715. 
The Supreme Court noted that the defense was not obligated to tum over the psychiatric 
report under IRE 503(b)(2), which creates a psychotherapist-patient privilege in criminal actions, 
and that the decision to tum over the report could not have been strategic because defense 
counsel did not know what the psychiatrist's conclusions would be at the time the plea was 
entered. 
The same is true here. Mr. Martens should have had Mr. Murray submit to a confidential 
domestic violence evaluation and review it before advising his client to enter into the plea 
agreement with the State, especially knowing that the Court would order a domestic violence 
evaluation. Under State v. Wood, he should not have agreed to tum over the results of the 
domestic violence evaluation prior to its completion and his review thereof. Moreover, defense 
counsel should have been aware of the Wood decision as it was issued prior to Mr. Murray's 
case. Further, once the report was completed, Mr. Martens should have taken steps to militate 
the damage to his client. But, he failed to do anything to challenge the reliability of Mr. 




Wilson's opinions and conclusions. As a result, Mr. Murray has stated a prima facie case of 
ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to advise Court of mitigating evidence at 
sentencing 
Mr. Martens' performance at sentencing was also deficient under Strickland. First, he did 
not go over the PSI with Mr. Murray until the morning of sentencing and Mr. Murray did not 
have enough time to review it prior to sentencing. At the same time, Mr. Martens did not inform 
Mr. Murray that he could seek a continuance of the sentencing hearing so they could go over the 
PSI. This prejudiced Mr. Murray because the PSI contained damaging statements made by his 
wife which were untrue. Mr. Martens, however, did not attempt to disprove these false 
statements; nor did he attempt to question the credibility of these statements. 
If Mr. Martens had been more fully prepared he could have informed the Court that Mr. 
Murray's my wife had been charged with domestic assault against her boyfriend Greg Evans for 
throwing things at him and threatening him with a tire iron. In addition, Mr. Murray's wife, at 
the time of the sentencing hearing, had been charged with aggravated assault for threatening her 
boyfriend's mother with a kitchen knife. Finally, Mr. Martens did not inform the Court at 
sentencing that it was mistaken about important facts during sentencing. These are set out at ~[ 
61 of the Petition. Had Mr. Martens done all the above, there is a reasonable probability that the 
Court would have followed the plea agreement. Thus, Mr. Murray has stated a prima facie case 
of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Strickland v. Washington. In 
addition, Mr. Martens failed to inform Mr. Murray that he had the right to file a notice of appeal 
from the sentencing. He also failed to file such a notice causing Mr. Murray to lose the right to 




appeal the sentence. Had counsel advised Mr. Murray about his right to appeal, Mr. Murray 
would have directed Mr. Martens to file an appeal. These facts also establish a prima facie case 
of ineffective assistance of counsel under Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000). See e.g., 
Judd v. State, 148 Idaho 22, 25, 218 P.3d 1,4 (Ct. App. 2009) ("Judd's additional allegations 
that his counsel failed to file an appeal from the judgment of conviction as requested and failed 
to file a motion to reduce the sentence as requested also state cognizable claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel."). 
Ineffective assistance of counsel at post-sentencing proceedings. 
In addition, the Petition sets forth a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel 
at post-sentencing proceedings. "A criminal defendant has a right to counsel at all critical stages 
of the criminal process, including pursuit of a Rule 35 motion." State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 
523,873 P.2d '167,168 (Ct. App. 1994) citing Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 923 n. 3, 828 
P.2d 1323, 1328 n. 3 (Ct. App.1992). The right to counsel necessarily requires the effective 
assistance of counsel. Strickland, supra. Here, post-sentencing counsel's performance was 
deficient in several respects. First, he did not inform Mr. Murray that he could obtain another 
domestic violence evaluation in order to rebut the findings in the court-ordered evaluation and 
support his Rule 35 motion. Had Mr. Murray known he could obtain another evaluation, he 
would have obtained one. Further, Mr. Ellsworth did not attempt to disprove the false statements 
made against Mr. Murray in the Rule 35 Motion. Had he done so, he would have found evidence 
which would have demonstrated the unreliability of Mr. Murray's wife's allegations as set forth 
in <j[91 56-60 of the Petition. Mr. Ellsworth also did not inform the Court that it was mistaken 
about important facts during sentencing as set forth in <j[ 61 of the Petition. However, had Mr. 






Ellsworth adequately prepared the Rule 35 motion and supported it with reasonable available 
information, the Court would have granted the Rule 35 and followed the plea agreement. Again, 
aprimajacie case of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland has been pleaded and 
summary disposition would not be appropriate. 
4. The State's "Fourth Defense" Is a Misnomer as it is Actually its Answer to the 
Petition. 
What the State styles as a "Fourth Defense" is actually its Answer to the allegations in 
the Petition. It does not seek summary disposition. As described above, the Petition and its 
supporting documents and the State's Answer establishes that there are genuine questions of 
material fact in this case and an evidentiary hearing should be ordered. 
Respectfully submitted thiS~y of November, 2010. 
~f.~SS 9 ~r ~_ 
Dennis Benjamin \ 
Attorney for Jeffrey Murray 
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Petitioner, Jeffrey Murray, moves this Court for its order granting summary disposition in 
his favor. This motion is brought pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c). It is based on the files and 
records in this case and the files and record in the case of State v. Jeffrey Murray, Ada County 
CR-FE-2009-61 02. It is supported by a memorandum of law filed contemporaneously herewith. 
Respectfully submitted thi~yof January 2011. 
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Attorney for Jeffrey Murray 
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Petitioner, Jeffrey Murray, submits the following in support of his motion for summary 
disposition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c). 
A. The Plea ofGuilty Should Be Vacated Because it Was Not Knowingly, Intelligently 
and Voluntarily Made. 
Mr. Murray has alleged that he was not aware at the time he entered the guilty plea that 
the Court did not have to follow the terms of the plea agreement. He has also alleged that he 
would not have pleaded guilty had he known. In particular, Mr. Murray states under oath that 
Mr. Martens did not tell him that the Court did not have to follow the terms of the plea 
agreement. And, the transcript of the change of plea hearing establishes that the Court did not 
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tell him that it did not have to follow the terms of the plea agreement. See Change of Plea 
Hearing Transcript (Exhibit A to petition). Further the Court's guilty plea questionnaire did not 
inform Mr. Murray that the Court was not required to follow the terms ofthe plea agreement. 
Paragraph 11 of the guilty plea questionnaire only asked if Mr. Murray understood that the Court 
was not required to follow the terms of the plea agreement. Guilty Plea Advisory Form, ~ 11 
(Exhibit B to petition). Mr. Murray did not respond to Paragraph 11 because he believed that the 
Court was required to follow the terms of the plea agreement. Further, Mr. Martens specifically 
told Mr. Murray that paragraph 11 did not apply to him because he was only to be sentenced to 
120 days. 
If the above is true, the guilty plea is constitutionally invalid because it was not made 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
"Whether a plea is voluntary and understood entails inquiry into three areas: (1) whether the 
defendant's plea was voluntary in the sense that he understood the nature of the charges and was 
not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury 
trial, to confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself; and (3) whether the 
defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty." State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34, 
557 P.2d 626, 628 (1976). Mr. Murray is entitled to summary disposition because the State has 
failed to raise a genuine question as to the truth ofMr. Murray's verified allegations. 
The State's response to the above is simply that "paragraph 11 of the Guilty Plea 
Advisory specifically notified the Petitioner that the Court was not bound by the agreement[.]" 
Answer, ~ 4. However, that is not correct because Paragraph 11 asks if the defendant knows that 
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the Court is not bound. That calls for a "yes," "no" or "not applicable" response. Mr. Murray 
did not respond because "Mr. Martens specifically told me that paragraph 11 did not apply to me 
because I was only to be sentenced to 120 days." See Exhibit B to Petition. In fact, Mr. Murray 
answered every applicable question and acknowledged every "Statement of Rights & 
Explanation of Waivers by Plea of Guilty" except paragraph 11. Since the State has failed to 
produce any evidence contradicting Mr. Murray's verified allegations and unchallenged Exhibits 
regarding the above, there is no genuine question of fact as to this cause of action, summary 
disposition should be granted and the Court should permit Mr. Murray to withdraw his guilty 
plea. 
B. The Sentence Should be Vacated Because Counsel at the Plea and Sentencing 
Hearings Was Constitutionally Ineffective under Estrada v. State and State v. Wood. 
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has 
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the 
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). Idaho law also guarantees a criminal 
defendant's right to counsel. Idaho Const. art. I, § 13; I.C. § 19-852. In general, a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or federal constitution, is analyzed 
under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) standard. In order to prevail 
under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's performance was deficient in that it 
fell below standards of reasonable professional performance; and 2) that this deficient 
performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689. The 
prejudice prong of the test is shown ifthere is a reasonable probability that a different result 
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would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. Id. 
In this case, counsel was ineffective under Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 
(2006), because counsel did not infonn Mr. Murray of the rights he was required to waive by the 
Court and under the tenns of the plea agreement. While the guilty plea questionnaire infonned 
Mr. Murray that he was waiving his rights under "State v. Estrada," trial counsel never explained 
to Mr. Murray what those rights were. Thus, when the Court ordered that a domestic violence 
evaluation be done and submitted to the Court Mr. Murray was not aware that he had any choice 
but to submit to the evaluation. Further, he believed the waiver - whatever it involved - was of 
no consequence because the Court could not sentence him to more than 120 days ofjail no 
matter the result. 
The record shows that the Court, at the change of plea hearing, asked if there was an 
Estrada waiver, but never ensured that Mr. Murray understood what he was giving up. The 
transcript shows the following: 
THE COURT: Okay, is there an Estrada waiver? 
MS. BUTTRAM: I believe so. 
THE COURT: Well I think there would have to be. I'm not going to take it without an 
Estrada waiver.
 




MR. MARTENS: Yes, that's fine. He will waive, Your Honor.
 
THE COURT: Is that what you want to do, Mr. Murray?
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
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Exhibit A to the Petition, pg. 7, In. 25 - pg. 8, In. 13. There is no indication in the above that 
/l defense counsel was informing Mr. Murray about the meaning of the waiver. He seeks a 
J \ Further, trial counsel did not obtain an independent, confidential domestic violence 
\.3,' ~.~ evaluation prior to the entry of the guilty plea and never explained to Mr. Murray that he had a 
\j~ right to obtain his own domestic violence evaluation which would not be released to the Court 
(	 without his permission. Mr. Murray's allegation that he would have obtained his own 
confidential domestic violence evaluation had he been so informed has not been contradicted by 
the State in any meaningful way. 
Trial counsel's performance with respect to the Estrada waiver and failure to object to 
the court-ordered, non-confidential evaluation was deficient under State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 
100, 967 P.2d 702, 714 (1998). In Wood, the defendant pleaded guilty and at the change ofplea 
hearing the Court ordered that the report of a defense expert, which had not yet been prepared, be 
included in the presentence investigation report. Defense counsel did not object. On appeal, the 
Supreme Court found the failure to object to the inclusion of the report was deficient 
performance because "in this case the report had not been written, and [counsel] did not know 
whether it would be favorable or unfavorable." 132 Idaho at 101,967 P.2d at 716. The same is 
true here, defense counsel did not know whether the evaluation would be favorable or 
unfavorable and should not have allowed Mr. Murray to participate in the evaluation. 
The Wood Court also noted that "[i]f a psychiatrist or psychologist had been appointed by 
the court for purposes of a presentence investigation, counsel for Wood would have had the 
5·	 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 











opportunity to advise his client of the possible uses of the infonnation and of the privilege 
against self-incrimination. In the context in which this report was prepared, Wood and his 
attorney were deprived ofthis opportunity." Id. Likewise here, counsel should have advised Mr. 
Murray of his right to obtain an independent, confidential evaluation and of his right to remain 
silent and to not participate in a non-confidential report. (Indeed, the Court's Guilty Plea 
Advisory Fonn does not require defendants to submit to non-confidential evaluations. To the 
contrary, it says "I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still have the 
right to remain silent with respect to any other crime(s) and with respect to answering questions 
or providing information that may increase my sentence." Exhibit B, pg. 1 [emphasis added].) 
Thus, counsel should have obtained a confidential evaluation before advising Mr. Murray to 
accept the state's settlement offer. 
This deficient perfonnance prejudiced Mr. Murray. The court-ordered evaluation was 
highly unfavorable to Mr. Murray and the Court relied, in part, upon Mr. Wilson's conclusions in 
rejecting the negotiated sentencing recommendation and imposing a substantial prison sentence. 
Further, had Mr. Murray been aware ofthe possibility that the Court could use the evaluation in 
reaching a decision whether to send him to prison he would not have accepted a settlement 
agreement where he was required to waive his right to a confidential evaluation. 
As the State has failed to produce any evidence contradicting Mr. Murray's verified 
allegations or challenging the Exhibits attached to the Petition, there is no genuine question of 
material fact regarding this cause of action. The Court should grant the motion, vacate the 
sentence and place Mr. Murray on probation. 
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c. The Sentence Should be Vacated Because Counsel at the Plea and Sentencing 
Hearings Failed to Correct Material Misunderstandings ofFact and Failed to Present Readily 
A vailable and Relevant Evidence. 
In addition, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to correct mistakes in the court-
ordered evaluation and misunderstandings at the sentencing hearing. Defense counsel was in 
possession of the court-ordered evaluation prior to sentencing. However, counsel did not review 
the evaluation with Mr. Murray. Nor did he contact Mr. Wilson or take any actions to try to 
correct factual mistakes in the court-ordered evaluation. Nor did he inform Mr. Murray that he 
could get another evaluation to rebut the findings in the court-ordered evaluation. 
Further, defense counsel did not go over the Presentence Investigation Report with Mr. 
Murray until the morning of sentencing. Mr. Murray was given the PSI shortly before the 
sentencing hearing and did not have enough time to review it prior to sentencing. Defense 
counsel did not inform Mr. Murray that he could seek a continuance of the sentencing hearing so 
he could go over the PSI with counsel. 
All the above was deficient performance on the part of defense counsel because it allIed 
to the following. 
First, counsel did not attempt to impeach the credibility of Regina Murray's statements. 
For example, it was public knowledge that she had been charged with domestic assault against 
her boyfriend, Greg Evans, for throwing things at him and threatening him with a tire iron. 
Further, she was charged in August of 2009 with aggravated assault for threatening her 
boyfriend's mother with a kitchen knife. However, the Court was not made aware of these 
pending charges. Mr. Murray's wife's credibility was important because the Court found that he 
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had engaged in a pattern of "extreme sadistic behavior toward partners." Mr. Wilson also used 
the statements in reaching his conclusions. See Wilson Report, pg. 7. However, those 
accusations only come from the uncorroborated statements ofMr. Murray's estranged wife who 
was facing aggravated assault and domestic violence charges at the time of sentencing (and who 
is currently facing a murder charge). 
Second, counsel did not inform the Court that it was mistaken about other important facts 
during sentencing. In particular, counsel did not correct the following: 
• The Court stated that Mr. Murray had engaged in "prior incidents of domestic 
violence" and "stalking behavior of other girlfriends or significant others." Sentencing 
Transcript, pg. 33, In. 8-12. Neither ofthese statements are correct. Mr. Murray's wife 
made such accusations to the police but later recanted. 
• Mr. Murray's wife told the police that the photographs were of consensual behavior, 
not of domestic violence. 
• The PSI does not state that Mr. Murray stalked other girlfriends or significant others. 
• While the Court mentions four times during the sentencing that Mr. Murray has 
"violated past protection order~," there is only one conviction for violating a protection 
order and there are no other instances (emphasis in quotation added). 
Mr. Murray was prejudiced by counsel's failure to adequately prepare for the sentencing 
hearing because had he corrected those mistakes the Court would have followed the plea 
agreement. 
Since the state has failed to produce any evidence contradicting Mr. Murray's verified 
allegations or challenging the authenticity of the exhibits attached to the Petition, there is no 
genuine question of fact as to this cause of action. Summary disposition should be granted and 
the Court should vacate the sentence and place Mr. Murray on probation. 
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D. Alternatively, the Cumulative Effect ofthe Deficient Performance Above 
Prejudiced the Petitioner and Thus Deprived Him ofthe Effective Assistance ofCounsel at 
Trial in Violation ofthe Sixth Amendment Under Strickland v. Washington. 
In analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court should not look to 
each example of deficient perfonnance and detennine whether it was individually prejudicial. 
Instead, the Court should consider all the deficient perfonnance and then detennine whether the 
cumulative effect was prejudicial. See Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 527, 927 P.2d 910, 917 
(Ct. App. 1996) and Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho 24, 32, 878 P.2d 198,206 (Ct. App.l994). 
"Separate errors by counsel ... should be analyzed together to see whether their cumulative 
effect deprived the defendant of his right to effective assistance. They are, in other words, not 
separate claims, but rather different aspects of a single claim of ineffective assistance of trial 
counseL" Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2003). 
So, even if the Court does not find that each example of deficient perfonnance was 
prejudicial individually, it must still grant relief because the cumulative effect of the deficient 
perfonnance meets the second Strickland prong. As set forth above, there is a reasonable 
probability of a different result had counsel's perfonnance not been deficient. 
E. Conclusion. 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should grant summary disposition in favor of 
Mr. Murray and: 1) pennit Mr. Murray to withdraw his guilty plea and set the matter for trial; or 
2) withhold judgment and place Mr. Murray on probation or, 3) alternatively, modify the 
sentence of ten years with three years fixed by suspending that sentence and placing Mr. Murray 
on probation. 
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Respectfully submitted this2Lf'Jay of January, 2011. 
~~eA~-
Dennis Benjamin \ 
Attorney for Jeffrey Murray. 
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A.M. 1: 'm'L~.~., _ 
FEB 09 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, ClerkGREG H. BOWER 
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney DEPUTY 
Tessie Buttram 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
200 West Front Street Room 3191 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone: (208) 287-7700 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JEFFREY MURRAY, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) Case No. CV-PC-2010-21310 
) 
vs. ) RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 




COMES NOW, Respondent, the State of Idaho, by and through its counsel of 
record, the Ada County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, and files this in response to 
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition. 
The Petitioner's guilty plea should not be vacated. Mr. Jared Martens, counsel of 
record for the Petitioner at the time he entered his guilty plea, did not inform the 
defendant that the Court had to go along with the plea agreement. Per his affidavit, filed 
contemporaneously herewith, Mr. Martens did not make any representations of this sort 
as this plea agreement had not been reduced to writing in a Rule 11 format. The State 
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION (MURRAY CVPC2010­
21310), Page 1 
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requests an evidentiary hearing on this matter as there is a genuine issue of material fact 
with regards to this allegation in the Motion. 
The State agrees, after consultation with Mr. Martens, that counsel did not 
communicate to the Petitioner about his Estrada rights by name. The plea agreement 
called for the Petitioner to waive these rights, and to cooperate with the domestic violence 
evaluation. Counsel advised Petitioner to participate in the pre-sentence process, 
apparently to include the evaluation. Counsel advised the Petitioner that cooperation was 
a good idea. The Petitioner should have been fully informed as to what these two 
components meant, including the implications of the waiver of his rights and agreement 
to an evaluation. Accordingly the State does not object to the Court granting a hearing on 
the manner in which Mr. Martens advised his client. In the event the Court rules in favor 
of the Petitioner and fmds that re-sentencing is appropriate, the State submits the proper 
remedy is a new sentencing hearing, not modifying his sentence from imposition to 
probation. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED This -.:i day of February 2011. 
GREG H. BOWER 
da County Prosecuting Attorney 
Tessie Buttram 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~tty of February 2011, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION to: Dennis Benjamin, Nevin Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP, 303 W. 
Bannock, PO Box 2772, Boise, Idaho 83701, by depositing in the U.S. mail, postage 
prepaid. 
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION (MURRAY CVPC2010­
21310), Page 3 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JEFFREY MURRAY, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) Case No. CV-PC-2010-21310 
vs. ) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF 








County of Ada )
 
Jared Martens, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1.	 I am a defense attorney licensed to practice in the State of Idaho. 
2.	 I represented Jeffrey Murray in the criminal case CR-FE-2009-0006l 02. 
3. I negotiated with the State a plea agreement that called for Mr. Murray to be 
placed on felony probation with the State capping their recommendation for jail at 120 
days. 
4.	 I never told Mr. Murray that this was a sentence he was guaranteed to receive. 
5.	 I never told Mr. Murray that the Court was bound to follow this 
recommendation by the State. 
6.	 This was not a Rule 11 plea agreement, so I would not have told Mr. Murray 
that the Court had to follow the State's recommendation. 
7.	 I did tell Mr. Murray that we were free to ask the Court to impose a lesser 
sentence. 
8.	 I would not have told Mr. Murray that paragraph 11 of the guilty plea 
questionnaire did not apply to him because this was not a Rule 11 plea 
agreement. 



















9.	 Part of the agreement between Mr. Murray and the State required that Mr. 
Murray participate in a Domestic Violence evaluation. 
10.	 Part of the agreement between Mr. Murray and the State required that Mr. 
Murray waive his rights under Estrada v. State, and that he cooperate with the 
Pre-Sentence Investigation. 
11.	 I did not fully explain to Mr. Murray what ''waiving his Estrada rights" 
meant-rather, I told him it would be a good idea for him to cooperate with 
the Pre-Sentence Investigation. 
12.	 I did not advise Mr. Murray to obtain an independent, confidential domestic 
violence evaluation. 
FURTHER Affiant sayeth not.
4"'1 
DATED this £- day ofFebruary 2011. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to en e me this ~ay of February, 2011. 
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Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JEFFREY MURRAY, ) 
) CASE NO. CV-PC-2010-21310 
Petitioner, ) 
) REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE 
vs. ) TO PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
) SUMMARY DISPOSITION 




Petitioner, Jeffrey Murray, submits the following in reply to the State's Response to 
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition. 
A. The Plea o/Guilty Should Be Vacated Because it Was Not Knowingly, Intelligently 
and Voluntarily Made. 
Mr. Murray accepts the State's concession that an evidentiary hearing is required on 
whether the guilty plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. However, summary disposition 
should be granted as to the other issues as will be explained below. 







B. The Sentence Should be Vacated Because Counsel at the Plea and Sentencing 
Hearings Was Constitutionally Ineffective Under Estrada v. State and State v. Wood. 
1. Counsel was ineffective under Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 
(2006). 
Trial counsel concedes in his affidavit that he "did not fully explain to Mr. Murray what 
'waiving his Estrada rights' meant - rather [he] told him it would be a good idea for him to 
cooperate with the Pre-Sentence Investigation." Affidavit, pg. 2. That, of course, is precisely the 
advice Mr. Estrada's attorney gave him which was found to be deficient by the Idaho Supreme 
Court. Further, trial counsel frankly admits that he "did not advise Mr. Murray to obtain an 
independent, confidential domestic violence evaluation." Id. Thus, the deficient performance 
prong of Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), has been established. 
In order to establish prejudice, all Mr. Murray must demonstrate is that there is a 
reasonable probability that, absent the domestic violence evaluation, the sentence would have 
been more favorable to him. Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448, 224 P.3d 515 (Ct. App. 2009). A 
reasonable probability does not mean "more likely than not"; it means a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 693-94. Summary disposition is 
appropriate in this case because it is beyond dispute that the Court relied upon the domestic 
violence evaluation prepared by Mr. Wilson in rejecting the State's sentencing recommendation 
and imposing the underlying prison sentence instead of suspending it. The Court stated, in this 
regard, that: 
Tom Wilson also engaged in a fairly extensive investigation into a domestic 
violence in the defendant's past. Tom Wilson concludes from the information 
that he obtains that the defendant minimizes the extent of his past violence. 




He may have alcohol issues, which he minimizes, because there are some 
indications that some of the violence and abuse occurs in the context of alcohol 
abuse. 
Tom Wilson concludes he does have poor impulse control. He does additional 
checking, additional verification. He, of course, brings all the information to the 
attention of the defendant, who says that he last engaged in, or he terms as rough 
sex, and Tom Wilson concludes that the defendant is of medium to high risk to 
reoffend. 
Transcript, pg. 34, In. 14 - pg. 35, In. 6. 
Since the State concedes deficient performance and the record demonstrates prejudice, 
summary disposition in favor of Mr. Murray should be granted on this issue. 




The State does not address Mr. Murray's contention that trial counsel was ineffective
 
under State v. Wood, supra, and apparently concedes the point. Thus, summary disposition 
should be granted as to this issue. 
C. The Sentence Should be Vacated Because Counsel at the Plea and Sentencing 
Hearings Failed to Correct Material Misunderstandings ofFact and Failed to Present Readily 
A vailable and Relevant Evidence, 
The State also fails to address this issue in its response. Summary disposition should be 
granted as to this claim for the reasons set forth in the memorandum in support of the motion. 
D. Alternatively, the Cumulative Effect ofthe Deficient Peiformance Above 
Prejudiced the Petitioner and Thus Deprived Him ofthe Effective Assistance ofCounsel at 
Trial in Violation ofthe Sixth Amendment Under Strickland v. Washington. 
This Court should hold that the cumulative effect of trial counsel's Estrada error, Woods 
error and trial counsel's failure to correct material misunderstandings of fact and failure to 









    
 
 
present readily available and relevant mitigation evidence was prejudicial under Strickland. As 
previously argued, there is a reasonable probability of a different result had counsel's 
performance not been deficient. 
E. Conclusion. 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should grant summary disposition in favor of 
Mr. Murray on Issues B and C as alleged in the Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and 
it should grant an evidentiary hearing as to Issue A. 
Respectfully submitted this J &~ay of February, 2011. 
~~:e~~-
Attorney for Jeffrey Murray 
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Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JEFFREY MURRAY, ) 
) CASE NO. CV-PC-2010-21310 
Petitioner, ) 
) MOTION TO ORDER CASE TO 
vs. ) MEDIATION OR SET HEARING ON 
) PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 




Petitioner, Jeffrey Murray, moves this Court for an Order referring this case for 
mediation. Alternatively, it should set the Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition for a 
hearing. This motion is made pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16(k)(2) and (4)(A) which gives the Court 
authority to order post..,conviction cases to mediation upon motion by a party. 
Mr. Murray filed his petition on October 27, 2010 and the State filed a timely Answer. 
On January 24, 20 II, Mr. Murray filed his Motion for Summary Disposition and a Memorandum 
of Law in support thereof. The State filed a response to the motion on February 9,2011 and Mr. 
Murray filed a reply brief on February 16, 2011. Since then, counsel's office has contacted the 
Court but has not been successful in obtaining a hearing date for the motion. 
I·	 MOTION TO ORDER CASE TO MEDIATION OR SET HEARING ON 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
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This case is appropriate for mediation because the State has conceded that trial counsel's 
performance was deficient under Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006) and 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Further, the record of the criminal proceeding 
establishes the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. It clearly shows that the Court relied upon 
the domestic violence evaluation prepared by Mr. Wilson in rejecting the State's sentencing 
recommendation and imposing the underlying prison sentence instead of suspending it. See, 
Hughes v. State, 148 Idaho 448, 224 P.3d 515 (Ct. App. 2009). 
Since the State concedes deficient performance and the record demonstrates prejudice, 
Mr. Murray has asked that summary disposition be granted on this issue. However, the remedy 
for an Estrada violation is a new sentencing hearing. So, mediation to see if the parties can 
agree upon an appropriate sentence is called for in this case. As Mr. Murray has already served 
19 months of his 3-year fixed term (after a plea agreement for a joint recommendation of 120 
days of county jail and probation), further delay in resentencing may deny him any meaningful 
remedy in his case. Moreover, if the parties can reach a sentencing agreement which the Court 
follows, Mr. Murray would be willing to dismiss the remaining claims in the petition, including 
that counsel was ineffective under State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 100, 967 P.2d 702, 714 (1998), 
and that the guilty plea was not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily as required by 
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should either order the case to mediation or set 
a hearing on the pending Motion for Summary Disposition. 
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Respectfully submitted this 71" day of April, 2011. 
~~~~
 
Attorney for Jeffrey Murray 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JEFFREY MURRAY, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) 
) Case No. CV-PC-2010-213 10 
vs. ) 
) 




Pursuant to the directive ofthe Court, a hearing for Post Conviction Relief in the above 
entitled action will be held on the 31 st day of May, 2011, at the hour of9:30 a.m., before the 
Honorable Deborah Bail, at the Ada County Courthouse, Boise, Idaho, or as soon thereafter as 
counsel may be heard. 
Dated this J I"day of April, 2011. 
G~.~PA~
 
Dennis Benjamin ' 
Attorney for Defendant 
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• FILED Tuesday. April 12.2011 at 10:45 AM CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CLERK OF THE COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
JEFFREY MURRAY, 
Plaintiff, Case No. CV-PC-201O-2131O 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ORDER TO TRANSPORT 
Defendant. 
Inmate # 93929 
It appearing that the above-named plaintiff is in the custody of the Idaho State Board of 
Correction, and that it is necessary that JEFFREY MURRAY be brought before this Court for: 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF HEARING........Tuesday, May 31,2011 @ 9:30 AM
 
It is THEREFORE ORDERED That the Ada County Sheriff bring the Plaintiff from the 
Penitentiary to the Court at said time and on said date; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That immediately following said Court appearance the Sheriff will 
return the said Plaintiff to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction until the court orders 
otherwise; 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Idaho State Board of Correction release the said Plaintiff 
to the Ada County Sheriff for the purpose of the aforementioned appearance and await further order of 
the court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED That the Clerk of this Court serve a copy hereof upon the Idaho 
State Board of Correction forthwith and certify to the same. 
Dated this Tuesday, April 12, 2011. 
DEBORAH A. BAIL 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Order to Transport 000092
 
 
   
NO.----:ll..ILE~~;"'.M~Z);t.~ao~--
A.M_---­
OCT 20 2011 
CHRISTOPHER O. RICH, Clerk 
. ~TARA THERRIEN 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE @UT'l 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JEFFREY DANE MURRAY, 
) 
) 








THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
)
Respondent. ) 
Jeffrey Dane Murray filed a petition for post-conviction relief on October 27, 2010. An 
evidentiary hearing was held on May 31,2011. The petitioner was represented by his counsel, 
Dennis Benjamin. At the outset, both sides stipulated that the Court could take judicial notice of 
the files and records in the underlying criminal case, including the presentence report. The State 
was represented by its counsel, Tessie Buttram. Based upon the evidence at the hearing, the 
Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
I. 
Findings of Fact 
1. On April 3, 2009, the police responded to a call where a woman was having trouble breathing. 
Upon questioning, the woman said that her boyfriend had been angry with her because he 
thought she was seeing another man. He slapped her and then choked her until she began 
coughing and having difficulty breathing. She said that she went into the bathroom and began 
coughing up blood. The officer observed that her throat looked sore and swollen. Her 
boyfriend, Jeffrey Dane Murray, said that they were fooling around, having "rough sex" and he 
might have grabbed her neck. He also told the officer that she had passed out "four times" and 











charged in an Amended Information filed June 1,2009 with two charges: a felony offense of 
Attempted Strangulation and a misdemeanor Battery. 
2. The petitioner was arraigned on June 1, 2009 and advised of his rights, the maximum 
possible penalty for both offenses, and confirmed that he was prosecuted under his true name. 
He stated that he understood his rights. His case was continued for entry of a plea. At the 
arraignment, he was represented by his private counsel, Jared Martens who represented him 
throughout the trial proceedings in his criminal case. 
3. On July 13, 2009, a Second Amended Information was filed charging the sole offense of 
Domestic Violence, a felony. The Second Amended Information was filed as part of a plea 
bargain agreement in which the State agreed, in exchange for his plea to a Domestic Violence 
felony charge, to dismiss the Attempted Strangulation and Battery charges. The State agreed to 
recommend a sentence of three years fixed followed by seven years indeterminate for a ten year 
sentence, suspended, and to ask for one hundred and twenty days jail. The plea bargain 
agreement was not a binding Rule 11 agreement and the Court was not bound to follow it. The 
defendant agreed to waive his rights under Estrada v. State and to cooperate fully with a 
domestic violence evaluation, an alcohol evaluation and the presentence report. The petitioner 
and his trial counsel consented to the filing of the Second Amended Information at the July 13, 
2009 hearing. The Court expressly asked the petitioner ifhe was giving an Estrada waiver. His 
counsel stated that he would. Tr. Guilty Plea Hearing, July 13, 2009, pg.s 7-8. 
4. As part ofhis guilty plea examination, the petitioner was examined by the Court in open court 
and also presented a signed written Guilty Plea Advisory form. He read, initialed his rights in 
the Statement ofRights, answered forty-three questions and signed the written Guilty Plea 
Advisory Form on July 13, 2009. The petitioner is forty-seven years old. The petitioner not 
only reads and writes the English language but has a high school degree and some college 








and that he understood the proceedings and his counsel. The Guilty Plea Advisory fonn 
specifically advised on page one in the Statement ofRights: 
2. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of guilty to 
the crime(s) in this case unless you are waiving your rights under State v. Estrada. 
Unless you waive your rights under Estrada, even after pleading guilty, you will still 
have the right to refuse to answer any question or provide any infonnation that might 
tend to show you committed other crime(s). You can also refuse to answer or provide 
any infonnation that might tend to increase the punishment for the crime(s) to which you 
are pleading guilty. 
The petitioner initialed this paragraph as instructed by the Guilty Plea Advisory Fonn. After the 
petitioner was sworn, the Court again advised him of his rights, and then stated: 
"Q. (The Court) And you understand you are giving up your rights under State v. 
Estrada, and that means that you cannot refuse to answer any question or provide any 
infonnation that might tend to show you committed some other crime? You need to talk 
freely and openly with the presentence investigator and with any domestic violence 
evaluator about any problems that you might have that might have a bearing upon 
sentencing. 
A. (The petitioner) Yes, ma'am. 
Q. And you are aware of that?
 
A (The petitioner) Yes, ma'am.
 
Q. Okay. Now, did you have any problems understanding questions on the guilty 
plea advisory fonn? 










Tr. Guilty Plea Hearing, July 13,2009, pg.s 16-17. 
5. At the time he plead guilty, the petitioner was specifically asked ifhe had any questions 
before he was asked to provide a factual basis for his plea. He was also asked ifhe had had 
enough time to talk to his lawyer and he replied that he had. He stated that he was not having 
any trouble understanding the guilty plea proceedings nor had he had any trouble understanding 
his lawyer. 
6. The Guilty Plea Advisory Form which the petitioner stated that he understood and signed 
provided the following information at paragraph 11: 
I understand that my plea agreement is a non-binding plea agreement. This means 
that the court is not bound by the agreement or any sentencing recommendations, and 
may impose any sentence authorized by law, up to the maximum sentence for any 
offense. Because the court is not bound by the agreement, if the district court chooses not 
to follow the agreement, I will not have the right to withdraw my guilty plea. 
7. Throughout the plea hearing, the State's sentencing offer was referred to multiple times as a 
"recommendation." Tr. Guilty Plea Hearing, July 13,2009, pg. 7. The petitioner's counsel put 
on the record that the defense was free to argue for less. Id. The petitioner was asked multiple 
times ifhe was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily, ifhe had enough time talk to his lawyer 
and to think about his plea. He replied that he was pleading guilty freely and voluntarily and that 
he had had enough time to talk to his lawyer. He was asked ifhe had any trouble understanding 
the guilty plea proceedings and replied that he was not. Tr. Guilty Plea Hearing, July 13, 2009, 
pg. 14. He also informed the Court that he had enough time to think about his plea and that he 
had had enough time to talk to his lawyer. Id. He was asked ifthere was anything else he 
wanted his lawyer to do that he had not done and he replied "No, ma'am." Tr. Guilty Plea 
Hearing, July 13,2009, pg.15. On the signature page of the Guilty Plea Advisory form, 
immediately above the petitioner's signature was the following: 
I have answered the questions on each page of this Guilty Plea Advisory form 
truthfully, I understand all of the questions and answers in this form, and I have discussed 
each question and answer with my attorney, and have completed this form freely and 







8. On September 15, 2009, the Court imposed a sentence ofthree years fixed followed by seven 
years indeterminate for a ten year sentence but did not place the petitioner on probation. The 
crime itself was serious and the pre-sentence investigation uncovered an extensive and long­
standing pattern of troubling domestic violence. The Court did not follow the State's 
recommendation for a suspended sentence. The petitioner moved to have his sentence reduced 
on December 8,2009. The State opposed the motion. The Court denied the motion for 
reconsideration on January 29,2010 and the petitioner thereafter appealed. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the Order denying his motion for sentence reduction in an unpublished opinion 
filed November 1, 2010. 
9. The defendant had a past record for violation of a no contact order, and domestic violence in 
Illinois in 2002. The presentence investigator found NCIC records showing a protection order 
barring him from contact with N.S. and another order prohibiting a GC from having contact with 
him. He had a conviction in Tennessee involving a Regina Murray, his ex-wife. There were 
frequent reports of extreme violence directed at her. Police reports recounted that he had pushed 
her on her back, slapped her, put a knife to her neck and chest and said "I believe I want some 
blood tonight." The report when onto to state that he then cut her left breast, causing it to bleed, 
and had sex with the victim while she was crying. The victim was contacted and verified that the 
information was accurate but she did not wish to press charges because she was afraid of 
retaliation. The investigating officer at the time the incident occurred had observed the marks on 
the victim's breasts from the incident and had photographed them. The victim did not continue 
the prosecution so charges were dropped. Another police report arose from a photo department 
at a retail store reporting pornographic photos showing a bound woman with blood around her 
nose and mouth, hands purple from the bindings on her hands, and what appeared to be a tattoo 
stating "Murrays property." The were other photos showing injuries and blood spattering. The 






Regina Murray. Regina Murray was contacted, continned that it was her, and indicated to the 
detective that she did not wish to prosecute. When contacted by the presentence investigator, she 
told the investigator that the acts were not consensual. The petitioner admitted to carving letters 
on his ex-wife's breasts but asserted that his behavior was consensual. A police investigator 
contacted by the presentence investigator described the petitioner showing him extremely 
troubling photographs showing domestic brutality. The petitioner's ex-wife also described a 
pattern of cruelty. Two women previously involved with the petitioner would not provide a 
statement for inclusion into the presentence report because they were afraid of retaliation. The 
petitioner minimized his involvement in the instant case and denied other domestic violence but 
the presentence investigator, after a thorough investigation into multiple other incidents, 
concluded that the petitioner was dangerous and was unlikely to succeed on probation. The 
presentence investigator, based upon the analysis of independent sources, concluded that a prison 
sentence was the appropriate disposition. 
10. The petitioner minimized his responsibility throughout the presentence report and denied 
any violence other than "rough sex." He reported that he had been diagnosed with an "antisocial 
disorder" and anxiety. In the presentence report, he stated that the victim had been angry at him 
and that "she said" he grabbed her throat and he "agreed to this." He said she went to the rest 
room and gagged, "spit up blood and left room." He said he had to revive her four times. He 
said elsewhere in the report that he and the victim were "fooling around" and had "rough sex" 
and he "might" have grabbed her neck when they were "rolling around in bed" but that he did 
not remember squeezing her throat although maybe he did it. The petitioner did admit to carving 
his initials on his ex-wife's breasts but asserted it was consensual. He insisted that all violent 
contacts with his ex-wife were consensual and that his behavior was nonnal. He felt that the 
prior women in his life were angry at him and trying to get back at him and were unstable. He 







not report any alcohol or drug problems. He felt that the factors contributing to his criminal 
conduct were "bad choice of a life partner" and "not staying up to date on current laws" and felt 
that he should be given probation. Other than stating that he had carved his initials into the 
breasts of his ex-wife with her consent and that he "agreed" to the victim's statement that he 
grabbed her throat, the petitioner did not make any incriminating statements in the presentence 
report. 
11. The petitioner did not make any incriminating statements in the domestic battery evaluation. 
He described the offense in a way similar to the way he did for the presentence investigator: 
"she said 1 grabbed her by the throat for five seconds." (emphasis added). His reports ofthe 
offense were always couched with "she said that" something happened; nothing was ever stated 
as: "I did" something. He told the evaluator that he had to revive her four times after she 
passed out. His lengthier description does not include any action by him except his thoughtful 
efforts to revive her after she inexplicably passed out. He did say that in the past they had been 
into strangulation and rough sex. He denied any prior violence. The evaluator was aware of 
police reports involving incidents ofdomestic violence with other partners. The petitioner did 
advise the evaluator that he had completed anger management classes as a result of his 2002 
charges. He minimized all improper conduct and did not express remorse nor did he feel he was 
in need of treatment. He had not been using alcohol or other substances at the time of the 
underlying incident. He said he might have put his hands around the victim's throat but denied 
any intent to harm her. The evaluator concluded that he lacked empathy, was not motivated for 
treatment and presented a medium to high risk for domestic violence. However, the petitioner 
himself made no incriminating statements that are detailed in the domestic battery evaluation. 
12. In this hearing, the petitioner contradicted himself when he was not being lead excessively 
by his counsel to make the "right" answers. After initially saying that he only heard about the 









bargain agreement at the time of his arraignment. He was arraigned on June 1,2009 in district 
court. He said he discussed the plea offer at that point. He also said that he read the Guilty Plea 
Advisory form and was given a recess to do it but now asserts that he did not go over the form 
closely. He said that he did read paragraph 11 but that his lawyer said that it was not binding. 
He said he did not know what it meant on the form that he would waive his rights under State v. 
Estrada. 
13. I do not believe that his lawyer told him paragraph 11 was not binding. Moreover, unlike 
the initial Statement ofRights in the Guilty Plea Advisory Form, there is no requirement that any 
other statement or answer in the form in use at that time be initialed so it is irrelevant that the 
petitioner did not initial paragraph 11 since he was not required or expected to do so. 
14. The petitioner's counsel at the time of the underlying proceedings was Jared Martens. He 
reviewed all of the discovery with his client. He engaged in plea bargain negotiations with the 
prosecutor and was able to get the charge ofAttempted Strangulation reduced to Domestic 
Violence and to get the misdemeanor dismissed. Part of the plea agreement, was that the 
petitioner would get a domestic violence evaluation which was required by law. He never told 
the petitioner that the Court was bound to follow the State's recommendations. He stated that 
the petitioner was aware that the plea agreement was not a binding Rule 11 plea. He admitted 
that he did not explain Estrada rights to the petitioner. In fact, he told the petitioner it would be 
a good idea to cooperate with the presentence investigator. He was aware that the petitioner 
would be likely to continue in his denials that any domestic violence occurred. He is very clear 
that he did tell the petitioner that the plea agreement was not binding on the Court. He also 
wrote in the Guilty Plea Advisory form: " ...state cap recs to 3+ 7, NCO w/victim...(defendant) 
may argue less. Cooperate w/psi.'" Mr. Martens was consistent throughout that he told the 
I In the original Guilty Plea Advisory Form, all of the petitioner's answers and his signature are in blue ink. The 
only portion in black ink is the recitation of the plea bargain agreement written in by his counsel, Mr. Martens. The 







    
 
 
petitioner that the plea bargain agreement was non-binding which was why the defense could 
argue for less. The written reference to the plea bargain agreement and the term used throughout 
the guilty plea examination was that the State would make a "recommendation" for a sentence of 
three years fixed followed by seven years indeterminate, suspended, and one hundred and twenty 
days in the Ada County j ail. The repeated references to "recommend" do not support the 
petitioner's current assertion that he had a binding sentencing agreement. The petitioner was 
well aware that the Court could go over the State's recommendation according to the petitioner's 
counsel whom I believe on this point. While I believe that the petitioner fervently hoped the 
Court would go along with the plea bargain or do less, I do not find it credible at all that the 
petitioner was unaware that the plea bargain agreement was not binding. It was explained to him 
clearly in the Guilty Plea Advisory form and in open court and I do not believe his current 
version at the evidentiary hearing in this matter. It was also his then attorney's general practice 
to advise his clients that the State's recommendation is just a recommendation and that the Court 
could go above or below it. His counsel pointed out that the non-binding nature of the agreement 
was also clear because he was hoping to get the Court to go below the State's recommendations. 
His counsel also denies the petitioner's strange assertion that he told the petitioner the case could 
be tried up to two or more times after he was found not guilty by a jury. The petitioner's 
testimony is not credible. He was led extensively throughout the evidentiary hearing to give the 
desired answer, including after times when he responded "incorrectly." Mr. Martens went over 
the presentence report with the petitioner prior to the sentencing hearing and got letters of 
recommendation to submit for the hearing. His strategy at the sentencing hearing was to admit 
that the petitioner had flaws but to argue that they were not severe. There is no evidence that any 
evaluation by any other person would have made any difference in the information presented to 
advised of the maximum possible sentence by his counsel and the top of the sentence in the plea bargain agreement 





the Court: the petitioner minimized the strangulation incident at the heart of the case in a 
consistent manner in both the presentence report and the domestic violence evaluation. He, no 
doubt, would have done the same had his counsel hired another evaluator. 
15. The petitioner throughout the underlying proceedings and in this proceeding comes across as 
an intelligent person. Certainly at the hearing on his post conviction proceeding, he picked up 
very quickly on his attorney's cues that he had not answered "correctly." He is an intelligent 
person who went through both an examination by the Court in open court on his guilty plea and a 
multi-page guilty plea advisory form. He specifically stated, at the time he plead guilty, that he 
had both enough time to think about his plea and enough time to talk to his lawyer. While his 
lawyer did not discuss State v. Estrada, the Court did, both in open court and in the written guilty 
plea form. Based upon all of the evidence, I find that the petitioner was aware that he was 
entering a non-binding plea agreement in which the Court could go above or below the State's 
recommendations. I further find that the petitioner did not, in fact, incriminate himself in 
uncharged criminal matters in the presentence report or the evaluation. The petitioner is an 
intelligent, reasonably well-educated, mature adult who was not taking any medications nor 
reporting any problems with his comprehension at the time he entered his guilty plea. I am 
certain that he fervently hoped that his attorney would succeed in obtaining a lesser sentence for 
him at the original sentencing proceeding and that the Court would suspend his sentence but I am 
also certain that he knew the plea agreement was non-binding and, as it states in black and white 
in the Guilty Plea Advisory form which he signed, that the Court could impose any sentence up 
to the maximum that was authorized by law. 
16. While the petition also challenged the representation of the petitioner's second counsel, 










An application for post-conviction relief initiates a civil, rather than criminal, proceeding, 
and is governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443, 
180 P.3d 476,482 (2008). See also Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 
(2008). An applicant for post-conviction relief must prove by a preponderance of evidence the 
allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. I.C. § 19-4907; Stuart v. 
State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 
61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002). 
The petitioner has raised several grounds for post-conviction relief: the plea was not a 
valid plea because it was not "knowing, intelligent and voluntary," he was not advised by his 
attorney about his rights under Estrada v. State, that he should have gotten a confidential 
domestic violence evaluation which would not have been released to the Court prior to the plea, 
that he was not properly represented at the sentencing hearing because his attorney did not get an 
evaluation which would rebut the court-ordered evaluation, that his attorney did not review the 
court-ordered evaluation with him, that the information in the pre-sentence report from his ex­
wife was not properly challenged and that there were other errors in the presentence report. He 
alleges that counsel he hired right after the sentencing should have filed a motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea and did not, that another positive evaluation should have been submitted in support of 
his motion to modify his sentence under ICR 35. In sum, the petitioner contends that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel at his guilty plea and at his sentencing. 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is proper under the post-conviction procedure 
act. Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 862, 243 P.3d 675, 678 (Ct. App. 2010). To prevail on an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner must show that the attorney's performance 










McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 847, 850, 103 P.3d 460,463 (2004); Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). To show deficient performance, a defendant must overcome the strong 
presumption that counsel's performance was adequate by demonstrating "that counsel's 
representation did not meet objective standards of competence." Nevarez v. State, 145 Idaho 
878,883, 187 P.3d 1253, 1258 (Ct. App. 2008). If a defendant succeeds in establishing that 
counsel's performance was deficient, he must also prove the prejudice element by showing that 
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "A reasonable probability is 
a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. Lastly, when evaluating an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, strategic and tactical choices should not be second­
guessed. Id., at 686. It is presumed that counsel is competent and that trial tactics were based on 
sound legal strategy. Id. 
Before deciding whether to plead guilty, all defendants are entitled to "the effective 
assistance of competent counsel." Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480-81 (2010). 
Similarly, a defendant is entitled to his attorney's assistance when he decides to participate in 
evaluations prepared for consideration at sentencing. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 
833 (2006). To prevail on an ineffective assistance ofcounsel claim, the petitioner must show 
that the attorney's performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced by the deficiency. 
Strickland v. Washington, supra. To establish a deficiency, he has the burden of showing that his 
attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 
Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). 
a. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel re: Guilty Plea. 
For a guilty plea to be valid, the entire record must demonstrate that the plea was entered 
into in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner. There are three areas which are focused 










of the charges and was not coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently 
waived his rights to a jury trial; and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of 
pleading guilty. State v. Workman, 144 Idaho 518, 527, 164 P.3d 798, 807 (2007). 
During the guilty plea hearing, the state noted that, pursuant to the plea agreement, the 
state was going to amend the information "from felony attempted strangulation domestic battery 
to one count of felony domestic violence." Guilty Plea Hearing Transcript, at 6. The petitioner's 
attorney, Jared Martens, further noted that "[t]he rest of the agreement is that he would stipulate 
to the elements ofhousehold member and traumatic injury, marks on the neck, he will waive his 
right to appeal on those two elements. The state would cap its recommendation at three plus 
seven, 120 days Ada County Jail, no contact with the victim, need to get a domestic violence and 
alcohol evaluation. Restitution and costs are open. The defense is free to argue for less. And in 
talking to the prosecutor, if he meets the requirements, they are not going to promote but not 
object to a withheld judgment in this case." Id., at 7 (emphasis added). 
The Court then clarified: "So he would plead guilty to the charge in the Second Amended 
Information, and the State will ask for three years fixed, followed by seven years indeterminate, 
for a ten year sentence, suspended, up to 120 days Ada County Jail, would get a domestic 
violence evaluation and alcohol evaluation, and the State might not oppose a withheld." Id. 
(Emphasis added). The petitioner testified under oath that his attorney had advised him the 
consequences of his guilty plea. !d., at 15. He also testified that no one had promised him that 
the court would be easy on him ifhe pleaded guilty and no one had offered him an incentive for 
pleading guilty. Id., at 12. The petitioner also signed a guilty plea advisory form which 
specifically stated: 
"I understand that my plea agreement is a non-binding plea agreement. This 
means that the court is not bound by the agreement or any sentencing recommendations, 
and may impose any sentence authorized by law, up to the maximum sentence for any 
offense. Because the court is not bound by the agreement, if the district court chooses not 









The fonn also provides that the petitioner's attorney "discussed in detail," the 
infonnation in the guilty plea advisory fonn. In addition, the petitioner acknowledged, in signing 
the fonn, that he understood all of the questions and answers in the fonn and had discussed each 
question and answer with his attorney and that he completed the fonn freely and voluntarily. The 
petitioner also testified that he had no problems understanding the guilty plea advisory fonn. !d., 
at 17. The petitioner now contends that he did not initial this portion ofthe guilty plea advisory 
fonn because he believed that the court was required to follow the tenns of the plea agreement. 
First, there was no requirement on the fonn to initial this paragraph. It was a plain English 
advisory that the plea agreement was non-binding. The petitioner's assertion is also not 
supported by his attorney's testimony nor by the other evidence in the record. Ifthis tenn were 
not applicable, the provision would have been deleted or otherwise marked as inapplicable. It 
was not. Moreover, this court does not accept plea agreements which bind the Court to a 
particular sentence and it is abundantly clear from the plea discussion that the state was only 
making recommendations and that the defense was free to argue for less. The guilty plea 
advisory fonn plainly advised the petitioner that the plea agreement was non-binding and that 
the court could impose any sentence up to the maximum possible sentence. Moreover, there was 
nothing said during the hearing that would indicate that the court was bound to the sentencing 
recommendations contained in the plea agreement. Both the state and the petitioner's attorney at 
the time noted that these were sentencing recommendations. During the sentencing hearing, the 
petitioner's attorney, Mr. Martens, also specifically stated that "we too would ask you that you 
follow the agreement." Id., at 28. There would be no need for defense counsel (and the state) to 
request the Court to follow the recommendations in the plea agreement, if the plea agreement 
actually was intended to bind the court in reference to sentencing. It is also telling that there was 
no argument made in the petitioner's Rule 35 motion that he was operating under the 






agreement. In short, the petitioner's assertions that he was unaware that the Court was not bound 
by the terms of the plea agreement are flatly contradicted by the record in this case. The 
petitioner's plea was valid. 
b. Ineffective assistance of counsel re: Estrada; Evaluations and Sentencing. 
1. Estrada. There is no question that the petitioner's counsel did not advise him of his 
right to remain silent at the domestic violence evaluation as required by Estrada v. State, 143 
Idaho 558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006) nor did he discuss the consequences of waiving that right. 
However, there is also no question that the Court did advise him of those rights on page one of 
the Guilty Plea Advisory form. Specifically, he was advised: 
I understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my right to remain silent about 
the charge I am pleading guilty to both before and after trial. 
2. The waiver of your right to remain silent only applies to your plea of guilty to 
the crime(s) in this case unless you are waiving your rights under State v. Estrada. 
Unless you waive your rights under Estrada, even after pleading guilty, you will still 
have the right to refuse to answer any question or provide any information that might 
tend to show you committed some other crime(s). You can also refuse to answer or 
provide any information that might tend to increase the punishment for the crime(s) to 
which you are pleading guilty. 
I understand that by pleading guilty to the crime(s) in this case, I still have the 
right to remain silent with respect to any other crime(s) and with respect to answering 
questions or providing information that may increase my sentence. 
The petitioner initialed both paragraphs. In the recent case of Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168, 
254 P.3d 69 (Ct. App., 2011), the Court of Appeals addressed the identical issue and held that, 
while "it is preferable for counsel to advise a defendant of his right to remain silent and to 
discuss the consequences of submitting to the evaluation," counsel is not ineffective for failing 
to re-advise his client after the trial court has done so. Since the Court in this case did advise the 
petitioner of his rights under Estrada v. State prior to any participation in a domestic violence 
evaluation or a presentence report, his attorney was not required to do so again. There is no 










2. Additional evaluations. Counsel at this proceeding has also contended that it was 
ineffective assistance of counsel for trial counsel not to get another domestic violence evaluation 
either before his plea for use by the defense or before sentencing. There was no showing of any 
benefit from an additional evaluation at any stage of the proceedings. It is speculative that an 
additional evaluation would have been of any use. In Gonzales v. State, supra., the Court of 
Appeals held that there was no obligation to obtain a confidential defense evaluation to inform 
the defense decision to participate in a court-ordered evaluation and that the failure to do so was 
not ineffective assistance ofcounsel. The petitioner has failed to meet his burden to show that 
his counsel was ineffective with respect to additional evaluations. 
3. Sentencing. The petitioner had access to the presentence several days before the 
hearing. No continuance was requested. A defendant's ability to dispute the findings and 
statements in the presentence report at his or her sentencing hearing is guaranteed. State v. Gain, 
140 Idaho 170, 174,90 P.3d 920, 924 (Ct. App. 2004); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 873 P.2d 
898 (Ct. App. 1994). A defendant is entitled to (1) be afforded a full opportunity to present 
favorable evidence; (2) be given a reasonable opportunity to examine the presentence report and 
(3) be afforded a full opportunity to explain and rebut adverse evidence. ld. 
The petitioner was given a copy ofthe presentence report before the hearing. He was 
aware of his ex-wife's letter well prior to the hearing. His contention that he only learned about 
the unfavorable information immediately before the hearing is not credible. On August 24, 
2009, the Court had to continue the sentencing. At that hearing, petitioner's counsel stated that 
he had the evaluation. On September 8, 2009, the hearing was held. At the outset, his attorney 











replied that he was going to address any corrections in his argument. No additional time was 
requested. 
The petitioner claims that he was not permitted to rebut claims by his wife, and that 
evidence that she was in j ail on pending murder charges was not introduced. First, it is 
fundamental that charges are not evidence of guilt. It is not proper impeachment, even it were 
true, to focus on charges against someone. A conviction can be admissible impeachment; a 
charge is not. The petitioner asserts that counsel should have pointed out that the court was 
mistaken about "important facts during sentencing," including prior incidents ofdomestic 
violence and stalking behavior. The petitioner contends that the behavior reported by his wife 
was consensual behavior, including the conduct depicted in the photographs. Both of these 
points were raised at the sentencing hearing. 
In this case, the petitioner did rebut, through counsel, many of the accusations against 
him. At sentencing, his counsel described the allegations as "baseless," and went on to argue 
that, "Quite simply, everything seems to be based on one letter and then expanded upon from 
that one letter. It's a little disturbing to me." Sentencing Hearing Transcript, at 30. Mr. Martens 
also mentioned that the wife was unavailable because she was "incarcerated." Id. The Court was 
accordingly aware of the general outline ofthe petitioner's allegations, and made its sentencing 
decision in light of that awareness. Moreover, since the petitioner's own statements that the 
conduct was true but consensual, confirmed his wife's statements, the argument has no merit. 
The petitioner was given sufficient time to review the report. His attorney made a tactical 
decision to argue that, although there was troubling material in the report, that the petitioner was 









the plea bargain. When the petitioner was given the opportunity to speak, he said that he agreed 
with his attorney. 
c. Issues raised in the Petition but not supported by evidence. 
The petitioner raised several claims in his petition asserting ineffective assistance of 
counsel against Joe Ellsworth, the attorney he hired nine days after he was sentenced. Mr. 
Ellsworth represented the petitioner in his appeal of the denial of his post-sentencing ICR 35 
motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed this Court's denial of the motion for sentence reduction 
in an unpublished opinion filed November 1,2010 in State v. Murray, Unpublished Opinion No. 
693. The petitioner presented no evidence at all on his assertions that he asked Mr. Ellsworth to 
file a Motion to Withdraw his guilty plea, or to appeal his sentence or that he should have offered 
some kind ofadditional evaluation in support of his motion to modify the sentence. No evidence 
was offered on any claim raised against Mr. Ellsworth. As noted above, the petitioner bears the 
burden of showing that he is entitled to post-conviction relief and where, he fails to produce 
evidence in support of a claim, this Court will not address it nor grant relief based upon unproven 
assertions. I.C. § 19-4907; Piro v. State, 146 Idaho 86, 190 P.3d 905 (Ct. App. 2008); Loveland 
v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 120 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2005). The fact that his application is verified 
does not dispense with the requirement that he provide proof of his allegations. Loveland v. 





The petitioner has failed to meet his burden to show that he is entitled to post-conviction 
relief. In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as stated above, the 












he or she was thereby prejudiced in the defense of the criminal charge. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). As noted previously, there is a strong presumption that 
counsel's performance was adequate which must be overcome by evidence establishing that 
counsel's representation did not meet objective standards of competence. If a petitioner succeeds 
in establishing that counsel's performance was deficient, he or she must also prove the prejudice 
element by showing that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result ofthe proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." [d. 
Strategic and tactical choices are not second-guessed. The petitioner has failed to meet this 
burden. 
The petitioner entered a valid guilty plea which was "knowing, intelligent and voluntary." 
His current assertions that he thought the plea bargain was a binding agreement are not credible. 
The petitioner has failed to meet the burden of showing that his counsel's performance was 
deficient, with the exception ofhis failure to advise him ofhis Estrada rights. He was not 
prejudiced by this error because the Court advised petitioner ofhis Estrada rights. The 
petitioner has failed to meet his burden to show that he is entitled to post-conviction relief The 
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Rule 77 (d) I,RC,P. to each of the parties or attorneys of record in this cause in 
envelopes addressed as follows: 
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
INTER-DEPT MAIL 
DENNIS BENJAMIN 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO BOX 2772 
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TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, State ofIdaho, AND ITS ATTORNEY, 
the Ada County Prosecutor, AND THE CLERK. OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant, Jeffrey Murray, appeals against the above named 
Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment denying Appellant's petition for 
post-conviction relief, entered in the above entitled action on the 20th day of October, 2011, the 
Honorable Deborah A. Bail, presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or 
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(l) 
I.A.R. 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal is listed below which the Appellant 
then intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent 
the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal. 



























• Is the Court's decision based upon unreasonable determinations of fact in light 
of the evidence presented? 
• Is the Court's decision regarding the Strickland claim an unreasonable 
application of controlling United States Supreme Court precedent? 
4. No order sealing any portion of the record has been issued. 
5. Transcript: 
(a) A reporter's transcript is requested. 
(b) The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions 
of the reporter's transcript in both hard copy and electronic format: Transcript of 
evidentiary hearing held on May 31, 2011 (estimated number of pages: 150). 
6. The Appellant requests that a standard record be prepared pursuant to Rule 28(b)(1), 
I.A.R. 
7. The Appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: 
(a) All exhibits offered and/or admitted at the evidentiary hearing. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom 
a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
Susan Gambee, Ada County Courthouse, 200 W. Front Street, Boise, ID 83702. 
(b) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript fee because 
he is indigent. A motion to proceed without payment of fees is being filed. 
(c) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the record because he is indigent. 
(d) That Appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because there is 
no filing fee for post-conviction petitions. 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20 (and the Attorney General ofIdaho pursuant to Section 67-1401 (1), Idaho 
Code). 








DATED THIS ~ day of November, 2011. 
~~ 
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Jeffrey Murray 
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to:	 Tessie Buttram 
Deputy Ada County Prosecutor 
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A.M. ft-"L~~  
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ISBA# 4199 NOV f 8 2011 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clerk 
303 W. Bannock By JAMIE RANDALL ' 
OEPUTY
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JEFFREY MURRAY, ) 
) 
Petitioner-Appellant, ) CASE NO. CV-PC-I021310 
) 
vs. ) MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT 
) OF THE STATE APPELLATE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) PUBLIC DEFENDER AND TO 
) PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 
Respondent-Respondent. ) 
) 
Jeffrey Murray asks this Court to issue an order appointing the Office of the State 
Appellate Public Defender to represent him on appeal and to pennit him to appeal without 
payment of fees or costs. Good cause exists to grant this motion because Mr. Murray has 
previously been found to be indigent by this Court and has filed a Notice of Appeal in this case. 
This motion is based upon the Sixth and Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article 
1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution and I.C. § 19-4904. 
DATED THIS -r~~ day of November, 2011. 
~~~~--
Dennis BenjamillS 
Attorney for Jeffrey Murray 
1·	 MOTION FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF THE STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
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Ada County Courthouse 
200 West Front, Rm. 3191 
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fJy JERI HEPTON NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
OEPll,. 
303 West Bannock 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
(208)345-8274 (f) 
Attorneys for the Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUl'1TY OF ADA 
JEFFREY MURRAY, ) 
) 
Petitioner-Appellant, ) CASE NO. CV-PC-2010-21310 
) 
vs. ) NOTICE OF FILING 
) APPLICATION FOR PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) DEFENDER 
) 
Respondent-Respondent. ) (piluJ VR Jef"'SiPJt)­
) 
The Petitioner, Jeffrey Murray, through his attorneys, submits the attached Application 
for Public Defender, as required by the Court, in support of his Motion to Appoint State 
Appellate Public Defender, filed on November 18,2011. 
Respectfully submitted this7~ay ofJanuary, 2012. 
~~o.-;--
Dennis Benjamin 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
JEFFREY MURRAY, ) 
) 
Petitioner-Appellant, ) CASE NO. CV-PC-2010-21310 
) 
vs. ) ORDER APPOINTING 
) STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) DEFENDER AND ALLOWING 
) PETITIONER TO PROCEED 
Respondent-Respondent. ) IN FORMA PAUPERIS 
) 
The Court, having considered the Petitioner's Motion for the Appointment of the State 
Appellate Public Defender to represent him on appeal and good cause appearing, HEREBY 
APPOINTS the State Appellate Public Defender to represent Mr. Murray on appeal from the 
final judgment denying his petition for post-conviction relief. 
IT IS HEREBY ALSO ORDERED that the Petitioner be allowed to proceed In Forma 
Pauperis, as he has	 d
DATED thiSjL~---r-V-"~Lf----/H;,L 'il.UD-<""" 
prev~0.t~een fo 
I·	 ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER AND 
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NO.----:~~__;:;~---­A.M· 8:00 FILED-1P.M _ 
TO: Clerk of the Court
 
Idaho Supreme Court
 MAR 15 2012 
451 West State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By BRADLEY J. THIES(208) 334-2616 OEPUTY 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
x Docket No. 39400-2011 
JEFFREY DANE MURRAY, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent-Respondent. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT OF 1BB PAGES LODGED 
Appealed from the District Court of the
 
Fourth Judicial District of the State of
 
Idaho, in and for the County of Ada,
 
Deborah A. Bail, District Court Judge.
 




DATE: February 14, 2012 
~ourtReporter 
Official Court Reporter, 
Judge Deborah Bail 
Ada County Courthouse 
Idaho Certified Shorthand Reporter No. 18 




NO'---:;=;:--~-ar~ ___ _ 









IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
JEFFREY DANE MURRAY, 
Supreme Court Case No. 39400 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being 
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to 
the Record: 
1.	 Transcript of Hearing Held July 13,2009 & September 8, 2009, Boise, Idaho, filed 
November 17,2010. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 15th day of March, 2012. 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
 















IN TIffi DISTRICT COURT OF TIffi FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIffi
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
Deborah Bail / T. Therrien 
District Judge Clerk 
JEFFREY DANE MURRAY, 
Petitioner, 
vS. 









Petitioner's Counsel: Respondent's Counsel: 
Dennis Benj~n Tessie Buttram 
ATTORNEY AT LAW PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
BY NO. DESCRIPTION STATUS DATE 
Petitioner 1 Copy of Guilty Plea Advisory Admitted 5/31/11 
Petitioner 2 Copy ofTranscript Admitted 5/31/11 
Petitioner 3 Copy of Evaluation Admitted 5/31/11 
Petitioner 4 Copy of Evaluation Admitted 5/31/11 
Petitioner 5 Copy ofLetter Admitted 5/31/11 
Petitioner 6 Copy of Cell Phone Bill Admitted 5/31/11 
Petitioner 7 Copy of Cell Phone Bill Admitted 5/31/11 
Petitioner 8 Copy of Cell Phone Bill Admitted 5/31/11 
Petitioner 9 Copy of Affd. of Complaint Admitted 5/31/11 
Petitioner 10 Copy of Cell Phone Bill Admitted 5/31/11 
Petitioner 11 Copy of Letter Admitted 5/31/11 
Petitioner 12 Copy of Affidavit Admitted 5/31/11 
Respondent· A Copy ofEmail Admitted 5/31/11 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
JEFFREY DANE MURRAY, 
Supreme Court Case No. 39400 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys ofRecord in this cause as follows: 
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER LAWRENCEG. WASDEN 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
BOISE, IDAHO BOISE, IDAHO 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
 
Clerk ofthe District Court
 
MAR 15 2012













IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
JEFFREY DANE MURRAY, 
Supreme Court Case No. 39400 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
vs. CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County ofAda, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true 
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
18th day ofNovember, 2011. 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
 







        
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
